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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Contracts are a backbone of the economy.1  Parties enter into contracts to solidify 
their bargains and carry out their intentions.2  However, subsequent unanticipated 
changes in law might defeat the very purpose of a contract.  “Our laws are not frozen into 
immutable form, they are constantly in the process of revision in response to the needs of 
a changing society.”3  New legislation, regulations, and common law are inevitable.  
However, such new law might prevent an existing contract from being executed as 
intended.  Familiar examples of legal changes that affect contracts include new tax plans, 
local ordinances, and food and drug regulations.4  Less familiar examples include new 
patent laws,5 remedies,6 statutes of limitation,7 court procedures,8 judicial decisions 
governing forum selection,9 and adjustments to the Uniform Commercial Code.10   
 
∗ Ms. Wu is an associate attorney at Shore Chan LLP practicing in the area of patent litigation and 
licensing.  She received a B.A. in physics from Columbia University, a Ph.D. in high-energy physics from 
California Institute of Technology, and a J.D. from Southern Methodist University.  She thanks Steven M. 
Geiszler, patent attorney (Gibson Dunn & Crutcher), Professor Gregory Crespi (SMU), and Dean Raymond 
Nimmer (University of Houston) for initial encouragement regarding the topic.  Ms. Wu is also grateful to 
law professors Adam Todd, Elizabeth Thornburg (SMU), and Joseph Thai (University of Oklahoma) for 
very useful advice.   
1 Arguably contracts exist ubiquitously and play a central role in our economy.  Even in ancient times, 
contracts were important to many of the major transactions in life.  See, e.g., Paul Halsall, Ancient History 
Sourcebook: A Collection of Contracts from Mesopotamia, c. 2300 - 428 BCE, in INTERNET ANCIENT 
HISTORY SOURCEBOOK (1999), http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/mesopotamia-contracts.html 
(describing contracts for the sale of real estate, food, crops, and for rentals, leases, labor (employment), 
borrowing money, and so on). 
2 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 341–51 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the term “contract”). 
3 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 82 (1974) (quoting Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1226 
(9th Cir. 1972)).   
4 See, e.g., Michael R. Taylor, FDLI Food Safety Conference: The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act: 
Putting Ideas into Action, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 27, 2011), 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OC/OfficeofFoods/ucm241192.htm (referring to the FDA 
Food Safety Modernization Act); David M. Herszenhorn, House Set to Follow Senate in Approving Tax 
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2010, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/us/politics/16cong.html (referring to an $858 billion tax plan). 
5 See, e.g., infra Section II.B. 
6 See, e.g., CoreBrace LLC v. Star Seismic LLC, 566 F.3d 1069 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
7 See, e.g., Chapman v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Douglas, 107 U.S. 348 (1883) (holding that a change 
in statute of limitation barred suit in a contract dispute); In re Apex Express Corp., 190 F.3d 624, 642 (4th 
Cir. 1999). 
8 See, e.g., Goldhammer v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 248, 255 (D. Mass. 1999). 
9 See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322, 349 (W. Va. 2009). 
10 See, e.g., David Frisch, Rational Retroactivity in a Commercial Context, 58 ALA. L. REV. 765, 768 
(2007) (citing changes to the U.C.C. Articles 1 (2001), 2 (2003), 2A (2003), 3 (2002), 4 (2002), 4A(1989), 
5(1995), 6(1989), 7(2004), 8(1994), and 9(2001)). 
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¶2 In each of these examples, legal changes might hamper contracts.  For instance, the 
imposition of new sales taxes on soda in certain states created an uproar because the taxes 
could increase product prices, thereby decreasing demand and profits.11  Until the taxes 
expire, existing sales contracts for soda hold volume buyers hostage to lost profits, 
because the contracts might not account for lost sales from the taxes.12  
¶3 This kind of scenario is prevalent in patent law and in patent licensing where courts 
are constantly reinterpreting the law.  Within the last three or four years, cases such as 
KSR v. Teleflex,13 Quanta v. LG,14 In re Bilski,15 Bilski v. Kappos,16 CoreBrace v. Star 
Seismic,17 and Uniloc v. Microsoft18 frustrated patent practitioners and licensors.19  The 
new decisions have the potential to cause previously-granted patents to become invalid, 
or change the scope of an already-executed license20 and thus diminish the value of the 
license.  Unfortunately, parties have few retroactive remedies. 
 
11 See Janet Adamy, Soda Tax Weighed to Pay for Health Care, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2009, at A4, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124208505896608647.html; Eric Boehm, “Soda Tax” Faces 
Many Opponents: Lobbyist and Unions Line Up to Fight Nutter’s Proposal, PA INDEPENDENT (Mar. 11, 
2010), http://www.paindependent.com/todays_news/detail/soda-tax-faces-many-opponents. 
12 The Business Council, Legislative Memo Regarding Tax on Soft Drinks, BUS. COUNCIL N.Y. STATE, 
INC. (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.bcnys.org/inside/Legmemos/2009-10/s6610a9710TaxonSoftDrinks.htm. 
13 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).  KSR confounded patent-holders and licensors.  
See Peter Lattman, KSR v. Teleflex: The Supreme Court’s Big Patent Ruling, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (May 1, 
2007, 8:07 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/05/01/ksr-v-teleflex-the-supreme-courts-big-patent-
ruling/tab/article/ (highlighting how many commentators thought that the KSR ruling might invalidate 
patents and make it harder to get a patent in the future). 
14 Compare Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008), and Mary LaFrance, 
LaFrance on Quanta Computer, Inc., v. LG Electronics, Inc., 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 2401 (2008) 
(LexisNexis Group), with Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  
Quanta puzzled practitioners, because it expanded the concept of patent exhaustion and seemed 
inconsistent with Mallinckrodt.  
15 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008); John A. Squires & Duane R. Valz, Awaiting and 
Anticipating Bilski, 2010 EMERGING ISSUES 4910 (2010) (LexisNexis Group). 
16 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
17 Corebrace LLC v. Star Seismic LLC, 566 F.3d 1069, 1072–73 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding the phrase 
“make, use and sell” implies have-made rights with regard to third parties). 
18 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  The 25 percent “rule of 
thumb” for calculating a reasonable royalty for purposes of infringement damages “is a fundamentally 
flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation,” and thus precludes its use 
for damages calculations.  This change has a major impact on past patent licenses that are paid-out and 
recomputed over many years and also on adverse licensing negotiations.  Based on the past cases using this 
rule, practitioners assumed this 25% rate to set their existing licensing rate and to anticipate litigation 
should anything go awry.  The Court did not propose a new rule in its opinion, thus leaving much 
uncertainty among the lower courts and practitioners. 
19 See infra Section II.B for further explanation of the impact of these cases to patent licensing. 
20 For example, even though Quanta was decided in 2008, there are already nine litigated license cases 
that follow Quanta.  The patent licenses in the following cases existed prior to the Quanta decision: Static 
Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 577 (E.D. Ky. 2009); Cornell Univ. 
v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 01-CV-1974, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60209 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2008).  See 
also KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (applying a looser standard than the former 
TSM test, thus making it easier to invalidate already-patented inventions as being “obvious”); Lufkin v. 
McCallum, 956 F.2d 1104, 1107 (11th Cir. 1992) (Regarding a revised statute of limitations, the court 
stated that if a new rule of law was applied to the parties in the case in which it was announced, it was 
applicable retroactively to all pending cases.).  Whether a new law is applicable may depend on the filing 
date of the cause of action.  See, e.g., VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 
1576 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
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¶4 Like judicial decisions, new statutes and administrative regulations also take 
immediate effect, or even take retroactive effect to the possible detriment of existing 
private contract holders.21  Unanticipated changes can render performance or breach of a 
contract impractical or impossible.22  Moreover, private parties to a contract are likely to 
lose if they attempt to challenge new laws based on constitutional grounds under the 
Contract Clause.23  Accordingly, new laws can also adversely affect already-existing 
private contracts.  If parties do not draft a contract defensively enough, there may be little 
they can do afterwards to salvage the situation inexpensively, if at all.  
¶5 Therefore, there is a need for a proactive solution to overcome unwelcome and 
unanticipated changes in law.24  The paper proposes to give private parties an option to 
include a “choice of time of law” clause in contracts to select the law existing at the time 
of contract execution or at some future time.25  Examples of such clauses include a 
provision that establishes “the formation, effect, performance, and construction of 
Contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of X existing as of the execution date 
of Contract;” a provision that limits the “interpretation and execution of Contract to laws 
then in force a year from the date of execution;”26 or even more selective clauses, such as 
“Patent License subject to Federal Circuit law existing at the time of execution of this 
license.”  This solution should overcome or anticipate all the possible changes regardless 
of how laws evolve, which laws evolve, when they evolve, or how long courts take to 
interpret a new law. 
¶6 The purpose of this solution is to promote stability and predictability.27  Locking a 
private contract into a particular law existing at, for example the time of a contract, 
provides more certainty for parties.  This allows an attorney to draft the rest of the 
contract knowing the law and include workarounds to any detrimental laws.  This is the 
same reason choice of law provisions are already commonly used in current domestic 
contracts.  However, current domestic choice of law provisions are only territorial and 
refer to the law of a location such as the state of incorporation.28  Contracting parties 
include these provisions in order to immunize agreements from uncertainties and to find 
 
21 See In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 626 (3d Cir. 1999) (providing examples of the retroactive 
application of various statutes, including one on the choice of law). 
22 See infra Section II.A. 
23 See, e.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 416 (1983).  The 
Contract Clause is in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
24 Parties deal with many pitfalls even with existing laws and would face the possibility of additional 
unforeseen problems with new law.  See, e.g., Charles A. Weiss, A Few Problems in Licenses and How to 
Avoid Them and Due Diligence License Review Checklist, INTELL. PROP. ISSUES IN BUS. TRANSACTIONS 
(Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.pli.edu/emktg/toolbox/Problems_Licenses13.doc. 
25 This paper does not suggest allowing parties to select any random time period such as past laws 
existing, for example, in President Lincoln’s day. 
26 Or more formally, what about a clause, such as “law existing as of [date X], which shall render 
inapplicable for the contract any later changes in the law” or “settlement agreement shall be subject only to 
governing law of [State Y] existing at the time of execution of this agreement”? 
27 See, e.g., Ronald T. Coleman, Jr. & David B. Darden, The Constitutionality of Retroactive Franchise 
Laws, 21 FRANCHISE L.J. 13, 14 (2001) (“Contracts Clause jurisprudence is essentially a balancing of the 
need for contractual stability and predictability on the one hand and the legitimate interest of the states in 
regulating to address public needs on the other.”). 
28 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1971) (“The world is composed of territorial 
states.”). 
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the most favorable law among the laws of different states.29  Nonetheless, these 
provisions do not account for variations with time.  As such, this paper suggests an 
extension to the existing choice of law clause to include a “choice of time of applicable 
law” provision in private domestic contracts.  
¶7 Enforcing an explicit choice of time of law provision in private domestic contract 
should encounter few obstacles.  First, some constitutional cases already hold that the 
laws existing at the “time and place of contract” are grafted onto each contract.30  Second, 
choice of time of law clauses have been implemented successfully in international 
contracts.31  In the international context, these clauses are known as stabilization 
clauses.32  The practice should carry over to American contracts.  To distinguish domestic 
from international practices, this paper adopts the phrase “choice of time of law” rather 
than “stabilization.”  Third, state common law suggests that an express choice of time of 
law clause would be a welcome addition to lawyers’ toolboxes.33  Finally, the proposed 
solution appears to be consistent with the Conflict of Laws rules that govern traditional 
choice of law provisions.34 
¶8 A major obstacle that an express choice of time of law clause may encounter is 
public policy.  When there are policy arguments against the adoption of such a clause, 
this paper proposes a test (“Test”) that courts may invoke in individual cases to verify 
whether the clause should be accepted.  The Test examines whether contracting parties 
could have substituted alternative language rather than using a choice of time of law 
clause to protect themselves against unanticipated negative changes in law, without 
violating public policy. 
¶9 Sections II.A and II.B provide further examples of the problem and explain how 
new common law and legislation take effect.  Section II.C proposes a proactive solution 
to the problem.  Section III.A discusses constitutional law and federal decisions that have 
upheld a concept of “time and place of contract.”  Section III.B discusses how choice of 
time of law clauses are already implemented in international contracts.  Section III.C 
covers state contract law in relation to such a clause.  Section III.D analyzes issues 
related to the Conflict of Laws.  Section IV describes possible public policy hurdles.  
Section V counters with a Test to determine whether public policy allows enforcement of 
the clause.  Section VI applies this paper’s solution to a specific example; namely, 
domestic patent licensing.  A choice of time of law provision seems particularly 
 
29 For example, the U.C.C. is not adopted uniformly among the states, so a choice of law provision is 
particularly important for commercial contracts.  See BRYAN D. HULL, INSIDE SALES AND LEASES: WHAT 
MATTERS AND WHY 3 (2008) (“Articles 2 and 2A of the UCC have been adopted in some form by all of the 
United States except for Louisiana.  States do not necessarily enact all sections of the UCC without 
change—there are a number of non-uniform provisions, the number of which varies from state to state.”). 
30 See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429–30 (1934). 
31 These contracts are between a private party and the foreign government.  See, e.g., ANDREA 
SHEMBERG, STABILIZATION CLAUSES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A RESEARCH PROJECT CONDUCTED FOR IFC 
AND THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON BUSINESS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2008), available at 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/p_StabilizationClausesandHumanRights/$FILE/St
abilization+Paper.pdf [hereinafter SHEMBERG]. 
32 Id. 
33 See infra Section III.B. 
34 See infra Section V. 
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appropriate in patent licenses because patent law changes often and dramatically.  Section 
VII concludes this paper. 
II. THE UNCERTAINTY OF NEW LAW AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
¶10 Contracts come in many types.  For example, there are covenants, agreements, 
licenses, leases, assignments for franchises, employment, insurance, construction, 
property, trusts, pre-nuptials, and banking.35  With many contracts in so many areas, there 
is a high probability that new legislation or judicial decisions can suddenly affect the 
scope of some existing contract in a way not intended or foreseen by the contracting 
parties.  Both new judicial decisions and legislation tend to take effect immediately even 
if they are enacted after private parties executed their intentions by a contract.  
Alternatively, a new law that appears at first to be unrelated to a contract, such as a rule 
of civil procedure, can create a tangential impact on a contract.  Tangential changes can 
be especially difficult for parties to anticipate.  The disruption to private contracts caused 
by new law motivates the need for a solution. 
A. New Laws Take Effect Immediately 
¶11 With respect to common law, both federal and state courts hold that it is within the 
inherent power of a court to give a judicial decision prospective or retrospective 
application without offending the U.S. Constitution.36  There are different factors for 
determining when procedural and non-procedural common laws are accorded prospective 
or retrospective effect.37  “If the new law imposes significant new duties and conditions 
and takes away previously existing rights, then the law should be applied 
prospectively.”38  As long as the judicially-revised conditions do not violate 
constitutional rights, it is a common law rule that a decision takes effect retroactively.39  
For example, in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., West Virginia changed its forum 
selection rules.  West Virginia courts applied the new decision to interpret forum 
selection clauses to even those that existed in contracts executed and drafted before the 
judicial decisions.   Application depends on whether the party to the contract is a state or 
 
new law took effect.40  
¶12 The retroactive application of new legislation is treated somewhat differently from 
41
35 See generally JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 8 (4th ed. 2001); E. Allan 
Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the 1980's: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 203 
(19
 
t they apply both to the 
pa ther parties in pending cases.”)). 
1276 (N.M. 1982). 
May 
90) (providing some examples). 
36 See, e.g., Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507 (1973); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372
(1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322 (W. Va. 2009); Great 
N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932); Crowe v. Bolduc, 365 F.3d 86, 93 (1st 
Cir. 2004) (“As a general rule, judicial decisions are retroactive in the sense tha
rties in the case before the court and to all o
37 See Robinson, 409 U.S. at 507–08, 511. 
38 Lopez v. Maez, 651 P.2d 1269, 
39 Robinson, 409 U.S. at 509–10. 
40 Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 352–53. 
41 Frisch, supra note 10, at 766–67.  There seem to be conflicting decisions regarding whether 
retroactive application of legislation is permitted and under what circumstances.  See, e.g., Robert C. 
Feldmeier, The Illinois Supreme Court’s Latest Last Word on Statutory Retroactivity, 92 ILL. B.J. 260 (
2004); James L. Huffman, Retroactivity, the Rule of Law, and the Constitution, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1095 
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a private entity.42  Unless a state is a contracting party, courts apply rational-basis 
scrutiny and defer to legislative judgment as to the reasonableness of new legislation.43  
The Supreme Court has construed the Contract Clause such that it “does not prohibit the 
States from repealing or amending statutes generally, or from enacting legislation with 
retroactive effects.”44  In fact, new legislation will sometimes contain an express 
provision allowing retroactive application.45  When there is no clear legislative intent and 
the parties' vested rights are not harmed or the statute is deemed to be procedural, courts 
may then apply the statute retroactively.46  For instance, where an amendment to an oil 
and gas corporate income tax did not create a harsh or unfair result for the affected 
parties, the amendment was held to operate retroactively.47  Likewise, when the patent 
statutes extended the term of a patent from seventeen to twenty years, a patent licensee 
was expected to pay for the extra three years.48  The rule also applies to administrative 
regulations that encompass a large body of law.49   
¶13 As a result, private contracting parties can encounter the consequences of changes 
from legislation, judicial decisions, or administrative law overriding the parties’ intent as 
expressed in their original contract.50  Worse still, this can cause breach of contract and 
lead to expensive litigation, such as over a hotel sales contract,51 a capital management 
agreement,52 or an agreement to purchase excess electricity.53 
B. Examples of Legal Changes that Affect a Contract 
¶14 There are two categories of legal changes that may affect a contract.  One category 
is related to contract law generally and the second category is related to other areas of law 
 
(2000) (noting that Supreme Court justices cannot agree as to retroactivity).  Regardless, there is case law 
where statutes have been applied retroactively. 
42 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 505–06 (1987). 
43 Id. 
44 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 (1977) 
(emphasis added). 
45 In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 626 (3d Cir. 1999) (providing an example allowing the retroactive 
application of 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) related to the choice of law provision). 
46 United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 17; Boyd Rosene & Assocs., Inc. v. Kansas Mun. Gas Agency, 
174 F.3d 1115, 1120–21 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Landgraf v. Usi Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 275 (1994)). 
47 Atl. Richfield Co. v. State, 705 P.2d 418, 424 n.17 (Alaska 1985).  It is arguable whether the oil 
companies were happy with the retroactive application of additional taxes levied by the amended 
administrative statute. 
48 BJM, Inc. v. Melport Corp., 18 F. Supp. 2d 704, 705–07 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (The agreement stated that 
royalty payments to BJM “shall continue until the last of the patents expires.”  Then, the patent laws 
changed, extending the life of a patent.). 
49 See, e.g., Rehart v. Clark, 448 F.2d 170, 173 (9th Cir. 1971). 
50 Both varieties, new legislation and judicial decisions, are referred to as “new law” in this paper. 
51 Landis v. Hodgson, 706 P.2d 1363, 1368–69 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (reasoning that if government 
imposition of a new law was an event, the nonoccurrence of which was assumed at the time of the contract, 
the performing party would be excused from the duty to perform). 
52 Admiral Fin. Corp. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that Admiral 
could not recover damages from the U.S. based on the enactment of the statute, as Admiral “assumed the 
risk of a regulatory change” and was not injured by the change). 
53 BP Chems., Inc. v. AEP Texas Cent. Co., 198 S.W.3d 449, 457 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the 
electrical generating facility’s failure to comply with new legislation that required it to register with the 
state's electric production and transmission grid rendered it impossible or commercially impracticable for 
the utility to either capture or resell the electricity). 
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that only impinge on particular elements specific to that contract.  In the second category, 
a new law seemingly related to a legal issue other than contracts may later turn out to 
impact the contract.  The distinction is important because different areas of law change 
more rapidly than others.  Parties may wish to overcome disruptions from only the 
rapidly-changing areas of law or only one particular area of law; this can be done by 
proper drafting of a choice of time of law clause to refer only to “patent law” or “food 
 
and drug regulation.” 
¶15 In the first category, for example, sales contract law and patent law have recently 
experienced wide-ranging changes that affect parties to contracts.  There was a major 
revision to U.C.C. Article 2 in 2003, which the states could choose to adopt and that 
would affect many sales contracts.54  In particular, the Bi-Economy Market, Inc. v. 
Harleysville Ins. Co. of New York decision appeared to signal a shift in New York 
contract law towards litigation avenues and revised rules for consequential damages.55  
Sixteen cases have already followed some aspects of the decision in Bi-Economy.56  
There are also new laws targeted at contracts for intellectual property, e.g., patent 
licenses.  In 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (“CAFC”) TransCore, 
LP v. Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp. decision created implied license obligations 
that disregarded express statements in the contract.57  The CAFC also held that 
unconditional covenants-not-to-sue authorize sales to third parties by the licensee for 
purposes of patent exhaustion.58  The third party in TransCore happened to be a 
competitor of the licensor.59  Thus, had the licensor anticipated the TransCore decision, 
he may have drafted the agreement with an anti-competitor clause.  Also in 2009, in 
CoreBrace LLC v. Star Seismic LLC,60 the CAFC expanded the meaning of the “make, 
use, sell” phrase to include implied have-made rights, which revises the scope of existing 
licenses that do not happen to have language expressing any contrary intent.61  Like KSR 
54 HULL, supra note 29, at 3. 
55 New York’s highest Court did not recognize independent tort causes of action for an insurer’s alleged 
failure to perform its contractual obligation under an insurance contract.  The First Department’s decision 
in Acquista v. New York Life Ins. Co., 285 A.D.2d 73 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), was not followed by New 
York Courts until the Court of Appeals’ rulings in Panasia Estates, Inc. v. Hudson Ins. Co., 886 N.E.2d 
135 (N.Y. 2008), and Bi-Economy Market, Inc. v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of New York, 886 N.E.2d 127 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2008), on February 19, 2008.  See Mark B. Seiger & Jeffrey L. Kingsley, Seiger and Kingsley 
On Panasia Estates and Bi-Economy Market, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 2150 (2009) (LexisNexis).  See also, 
Recent Case: Contract Law-Consequential Damages-New York Court of Appeals Holds that Insurers May 
Be Liable for Consequential Damages, 122 HARV. L. REV. 998 (2009) (citing Bi-Economy Market).  These 
new rules could have great consequences for insurance contracts because existing contracts were drafted 
with a particular liability calculation and payout model, not accounting for the additional litigation costs 
that could reduce profit margins for the insurance companies or even make them insolvent if a company is 
small and there is a major catastrophe. 
56 According to the LexisNexis Shepard’s report for Bi-Economy Market that was accessed on January 
30, 2011, thirteen cases followed, eight distinguished, and three were neutral to Bi-Economy Market.  
57 TransCore, LP v. Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 1271, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  See 
also, Ian A. Feinberg & Joseph A. Mahoney, US Federal Circuit Decision Affects Law of Patent 
Exhaustion, Licensing and Covenants Not to Sue, THE MAYER BROWN PRACTICES (April 13, 2009), 
http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=6476&nid=6. 
58 TransCore, 563 F.3d at 1274. 
59 US Court Rejects TransCore Complaint Against ETC on Open Road Tolling, TOLLROADNEWS (May 
23, 2008, 1:56 PM), http://www.tollroadsnews.com/node/3554. 
60 CoreBrace LLC v. Star Seismic LLC, 566 F.3d 1069 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
61 Lawrence M. Sung, Lawrence Sung on What Your Licensed Patent Rights Include: CoreBrace LLC v. 
Star Seismic LLC, 2009 EMERGING ISSUES 4545 (2009) (Lexis Nexis). 
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Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc. and Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., these cases 
become immediate precedent.  Accordingly, patent licensors would benefit from a 
 
solution that can immunize them from potentially drastic changes in law.62 
¶16 A second category of changes, namely new laws not related to contract law, could 
also affect the provisions in a particular contract.  For example, in 2007, the Supreme 
Court’s KSR decision eliminated Federal Circuit’s exclusive use of the so-called TSM 
(teaching, suggestion, motivation) test for gauging whether an alleged invention is so 
obvious as not to be inventive.63  The Court invoked a new test of using “common sense” 
to determine whether an alleged invention is an obvious combination of existing objects 
and methods.64  In the first year after KSR, there was a six-fold increase in the number of 
court decisions invalidating patent claims based on the new standard of obviousness.65  
Although the new test was not contract law, it tended to extinguish existing contracts.  
Likewise in 2008, the en banc CAFC in In re Bilski revised the test to determine whether 
method claims in patents constitute patent-eligible statutory matter.66  Applying the 
machine-or-transformation test from Bilski, a New York court backed by scientists 
invalidated an exclusive licensee’s gene patent that would diminish pharmaceutical 
licenses.67  Big software companies like Microsoft opposed the CAFC’s decision.68  In 
2010, the Supreme Court limited the role of the machine-or-transformation test, which 
potentially revives patents that were invalidated under the previous CAFC decision, and 
their corresponding licenses.69  As a final example, the Patent Reform Bill is winding its 
way through Congress, and includes many amendments, such as the controversial 
inventorship and patent-infringement damages provisions.70  In sum, these recent judicial 
62 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND OTHER INFORMATION ASSETS 1 
(2d
 




ut with the licensed 
pat
 
less the business 
alg




 ed. 2007). 
63 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
64 Id. at 420 (“Common sense teaches, however, that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their
primary purposes, and in many cases a pers
tents together like pieces of a puzzle.”). 
65 This six-fold increase in the number of court decisions invalidating patent claims is compared to the 
year before KSR was decided.  Nicholas G. Papastavros & Maia H. Harris, Do Predictions Come True? 
KSR, eBay, and the Real Impact on Patent License Negotiations, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, July 2008, at 1 
[hereinafter Papstavros].  The article stated that 38% of cases before a group of patent courts had a finding 
of obviousness invalidating at least one patent claim after KSR versus 6% of cases before the same group o
patent courts before KSR; that is approximately a six-fold increase.  As an actual example, a court denied 
an injunction in Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. because the exclusive license is likely to be 
worthless where the previously-valid patent is probably now invalid under KSR.  566 F.3d 999, 1002 (Fe
Cir. 2009) (exclusive licensee attempted to sue Teva et al. for patent infringement, b
ent invalid under the new KSR standard, the value of the license is diminished). 
66 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 964–65 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that business methods are not statutory
matter, the Court provided dicta that software patents are not statutory matter either, un
orithm and software claims recite sufficient machinery or physical transformation). 
67 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
68 E.g., Roy Schestowitz, Why In re Bilski Can Wipe Microsoft of
10, 9:19 AM), http://techrights.org/2010/05/10/bilsk
69 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010). 
70 Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform Act of 2009, PATENTLYO (Mar. 3, 2009, 2:58 PM), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/patent-reform-act-of-2009.html.  A similar Patent Reform Act 
(Bill) was started in 2007 but was not successful.  There is now a Patent Reform Act of 2011.  See, e.g., 
Andrew Ramonas, Senate Judiciary Panel Leaders to Introduce Patent Reform Bill, MAIN JUSTICE (Jan. 
21, 2011, 12:56 PM), h
tent-reform-bill/. 
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decisions immediately took effect and invalidated existing patents.71  Likewise, the new 
Patent Reform Act is also expected to have immediate consequences.  As a result, 
existing licenses for already granted patents may be in jeopardy if a licensor failed to 
ented after the 
with 
some provisions that could immunize the parties from the vagaries of any new law.   
 
anticipate the changes when drafting the contract.72  
¶17 Aside from patent law, food goods in a sales contract are also illustrative of the 
second category of changes.  There are often revisions to food laws (e.g. laws governing 
the handling, inspection, delivery, etc. of food), or to tax laws that affect the price of the 
food goods.73  Manufacturers follow the revised laws that are implem
execution of their contracts, whether or not they welcome the new law.74  
¶18 As the examples show, the variety of changes sufficiently divergent that parties 
would be hard pressed to come up with a protective provision for each scenario without 
increasing their contract to an unwieldy length.  Moreover, legal changes create concerns 
for many years.75  A law can remain uncertain until courts slowly interpret and apply it to 
cases.76  Instead of a long, nervous wait, companies and practitioners could renegotiate 
their existing contracts.  But renegotiation can be expensive and leave the parties 
uncertain as to appropriate salutary contract language.  Alternatively, parties can try to 
fight the new law reactively and argue frustration of purpose of the contract.77  There is 
even a suggestive “solution” in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts tailored to the 
impracticality of performance due to intervening law.78  But litigation to overcome a new 
law is expensive and even more uncertain than renegotiating the private contract.79  As 
such, it would be opportune if the original agreements could be proactively drafted 
71 After KSR, the first four cases heard by the Federal Circuit regarding “obvious” inventions in essence 
killed the patent.  See Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patentability Standards: Early Federal Circuit 
Response to the Supreme Court's 2007 KSR International Decision, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 477 (2007) 
(LexisNexis Group).  As for Bilski, see Lawrence M. Sung, Sung on Patent Eligible Medical Technology 
Post-Bilski: Prometheus Labs., Inc., 2010 EMERGING ISSUES 4810 (2010) (LexisNexis Group) (“Perhaps 
the most significant patent law case to be heard in 2009 was Bilski v. Kappos. . . .  While much public 
attention had focused on the implications for financial services and computer software companies . . . there 
were broad implications for the patenting of all technologies.”); Eric Bensen, Bensen on the Federal 
Circuit’s Landmark Decision Regarding the Patent Eligibility of Process Claims Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: In 
re Bilski, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 3063 (2008) (LexisNexis). 
72 E.g. Bilski, 129 S. Ct. at 3231.  Software cases adjudicated in the year before this decision were prone 
to be invalidated, and it is unclear as to how courts will decide. 
73 See generally Laws and Regulations, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?navid=LAWS_REGS&navtype=SU (last visited 
April 18, 2011). 
74 E.g., Interview with Susan Chao, in-house senior counsel at Frito-Lay (March 2, 1010). 
75 Even three years after KSR, practitioners still consider the obviousness test to be an “emerging issue” 
and generated no less than seven expert commentaries on LexisNexis and at least 330 law review articles, 
according to the Shepard’s report for KSR Int’l Co., v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398. 
76 See id.  
77 See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996).  
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 264 (“If the performance of a duty is made impracticable 
by having to comply with a domestic or foreign governmental regulation or order, that regulation or order 
is an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.”). 
79 The respondents in Winstar hired very large, expensive law firms, arguing frustration of purpose.  See 
generally Brief for Trinity Ventures, Ltd. & Castle Harlan, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
United States v Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (No. 95-865), 1996 WL 143638 (Could financial 
institutions that acquired insolvent thrifts be awarded rescission and restitution under frustration of purpose 
doctrine upon enactment of FIRREA, which eliminated special accounting treatment for those acquisitions?  
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, § 5, 12 U.S.C. § 1464). 
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C. Choosing the Time of Applicable Law 
¶19 This paper proposes that it should be possible for parties to include a clause in 
private domestic contracts to choose the time of the applicable law and to limit the 
interpretation and execution of the contract to some law existing as of a particular date, 
for example, the date of execution of the contract.  A riskier but related technique would 
be to choose some future law.  For instance, wills occasionally refer to future laws: “the 
Trust Fund shall be distributed to my then surviving heirs, according to the laws of 
descent and distribution then in force in Kentucky.”80  But because of the uncertainty of 
the outcome in legislative votes or court decisions in the United States, contracting 
parties should probably not select future laws to apply to their contracts.81  Because 
results are more predictable for contracting parties who choose known laws, this paper 
recommends selecting laws already existing at the time of contract.  There are many 
possible variations within such a choice, as explained in Section III-C.  To clarify, this 
paper does not propose that parties may randomly choose laws from any time period that 
they desire.  This would likely violate public interest and governmental sovereignty.  If 
nothing else, such a choice would be overly burdensome on the adjudication process. 
¶20 There are already hints that the public would welcome the option of choosing the 
time of law by contract as a means of reducing risk.  For example, apartment renters have 
“rent stabilization” clauses in their leases to keep the rent the same over a period of 
time.82  There are also contracts that stabilize the prices of goods, like electricity or 
gasoline, by keeping the price fixed over a certain time period.83  There are also 
stabilization provisions to maintain the price of securities.84  However, in these examples, 
the contracts only attempt to freeze prices and other commercial terms, but they do not 
have a clause to choose the time of the applicable laws that affect or govern the prices.  
Thus, should any new laws arise, the contract would likely be affected by them.85  This 
paper explores the feasibility of an explicit choice of time of law clause that can address 
the problems and act consistently with American jurisprudence.  
 
80 Minary v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Trust Co., 419 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967) (emphasis 
added).   
81 JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 106 (8th ed. 
2009). 
82 See Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. New York State Div. of Hous. and Cmty. Renewal, 83 F.3d 45, 
48 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that rent stabilization law does not constitute either physical or regulatory 
taking); Adamson Cos. v. City of Malibu, 854 F. Supp. 1476, 1501–02 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (concluding that 
city's mobile home rent control ordinance was substantially related to a legitimate interest). 
83 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 728 F.2d 1477, 1479–80 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1983); 
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 547 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); Naph-Sol Ref. Co. v. Murphy Oil 
Corp., 550 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Mich. 1982); Appeal of Pennichuck Water Works, 419 A.2d 1080 (N.H. 
1980).  For electricity, TXU Energy offers contractual plans where the rate of electricity remains the same 
for twelve months regardless of fluctuations due to usage, weather conditions, cost of production, etc.  The 
author is on a TXU plan called “TXU Energy Texas Choice 12.”  
84 See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (“Stabilization provisions 
have become commonplace pursuant to statutory provisions and administrative regulations and 
interpretations relating to their use.  While the authority to stabilize is generally given, it is only in 
relatively few cases that the authority has been exercised.”). 
85 See, e.g., United Ref. Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 585 F. Supp. 626, 627 (W.D. Pa. 1984).  The appellate 
court's holding that the FEA had good cause to invoke emergency rulemaking procedures implicitly 
recognizes that the substance of the regulation was within the agency's power vis-à-vis existing legislation. 
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III. FACTORS THAT WEIGH IN FAVOR OF A CHOICE OF TIME OF LAW CLAUSE 
A. Constitutional Law Related to the Time of Contracting 
¶21 American constitutional jurisprudence suggests that there is a basis for enforcing an 
explicit choice of time of law in domestic contracts based on the Contract Clause.  The 
Contract Clause states, “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts. . . .”86  The statement is significant for contracts because contracts are 
governed primarily by state law rather than federal law.87  Although the Clause is silent 
about the retroactive application of new laws to contracts a prohibition against retroactive 
application of new law may be implied88 by the Founders when they initially drafted the 
clause.89  Notably, the Contract Clause is placed next to the Ex Post Facto clause, which 
has caused some courts to argue that the prohibition against the application of Ex Post 
Facto laws also applies to civil matters such as contracts.90  Indeed, some delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention believed that it should.  Both clauses relate to due process 
issues: the lack of fair notice when new laws are applied retroactively and impair 
contractual intentions or deemed-criminal acts.91 
¶22 However, the fact remains that private contracts have suffered under the vagaries of 
new law.  One reason is that the Court has not settled on a framework or standard of 
review for analyzing Contract Clause issues in the same way as it has for other 
constitutional issues like substantive due process.92  For private contracts, the Court has 
tended to apply a rational basis review of a new law.93  Also, the importance and 
interpretation of the Contract Clause has varied widely over the years.  Some Supreme 
Court decisions have even refuted the plain meaning of the Clause and actually impaired 
existing private contracts.94   
¶23 Initially, contract rights and the Contract Clause were prominent in American 
history and jurisprudence.95  In the early 1800s, in cases like Sturges, the Supreme Court 
seemingly followed the literal meaning of the Contract Clause of the Constitution, 
prohibiting the application of new state laws when they impaired the obligation of a 
previously-entered-into private contract.96  Additionally, the Court defined “contract” and 
 
86 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
87 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, 1-1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.21 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 2009). 
88 E-mail from Joseph Thai, Constitutional Law Professor at Univ. of Okla. and former judicial clerk to 
two U.S. Supreme Court Justices, to author (June 13, 2010, 7:35 PM CST) (on file with author).   
89 Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 HARV. L. REV. 542, 547 (2009). 
90 Id. at 547 n.20; Town of Cheney's Grove v. VanScoyoc, 191 N.E. 289, 290 (Ill. 1934) (referring to 
both the U.S. and the Illinois constitution).  Other state constitutions also prohibit ex post facto laws that 
impair existing contracts.  See, e.g., United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Autrey, 723 So. 2d 617, 624 (Ala. 1998) 
(“A retroactive change in [the code] would impair the obligations of the plaintiffs' contracts, in violation of 
. . . the Constitution of Alabama of 1901. . . .”).  
91 Textualism as Fair Notice, supra note 89, at 547 n.20. 
92 Thai, supra note 88. 
93 Id. (referring to Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 418 (1983)). 
94 See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 502 (1987) (“Unlike other 
provisions in the section, it is well settled that the prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts 
is not to be read literally.”) (citing W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934)). 
95 United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1977). 
96 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 208 (1819) (“It is the opinion of the court, that the act of the 
State of New York, which is pleaded by the defendant in this cause, so far as it attempts to discharge this 
defendant from the debt in the declaration mentioned, is contrary to the constitution of the United States, 
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“impair,” stating that “[a]ny law which releases a part of this [agreement to do 
something], must, in the literal sense of the word, impair it.”97  
¶24 The role and sanctity of contracts was of paramount importance until the Lochner 
laissez-faire era ended.98  Then, the Contract Clause took on different meanings such as: 
(1) impairment must be substantial99 and (2) the powers of the states to create new laws 
affecting contracts are not limited, except with respect to the imposition of punishment.100  
In cases like West Coast Hotel, the Supreme Court demoted the “freedom” of contract to 
a “liberty.”101  
¶25 Subsequently, there were instances where constitutional law was interpreted in a 
way so as to justify the concept of a choice of time of law clause.  The following 
paragraphs focus on such case law in recent history.   
¶26 The Court returned to a more favorable interpretation of the Contract Clause, at 
least with respect to contracts where a state is a party.102  The Supreme Court concluded: 
Whether or not the protection of contract rights comports with current views of 
wise public policy, the Contract Clause remains part of our written Constitution.  
We therefore must attempt to apply that constitutional provision . . . .103  At the 
time the Constitution was adopted, and for nearly a century thereafter, the 
Contract Clause was one of the few express limitations on state power.  The 
many decisions of the Court involving the Contract Clause are evidence of its 
important place in our constitutional jurisprudence.104   
For example, in United States Trust, despite public policy concerns, the Court required a 
state to uphold the terms of its original contractual obligations based on the freedom and 
intent of contract.105  Arguably, if contractual obligations were considered to be of great 
 
and that the plea is no bar to the action.”).  Chief Justice Marshall drafted the opinion using his rather 
convoluted style of argument.  
97 Id. at 197–98 (“A contract is an agreement in which a party undertakes to do, or not to do, a particular 
thing.  The law binds him to perform his undertaking, and this is, of course, the obligation of his contract.  
In the case at bar, the defendant has given his promissory note to pay the plaintiff a sum of money, on or 
before a certain day.  The contract binds him to pay that money on that day; and this is its obligation.  Any 
law which releases a part of this obligation, must, in the literal sense of the word, impair it.  Much more 
must a law impair it, which makes it totally invalid, and entirely discharges it.”). 
98 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 641–
42 (1819) (“Contracts, the parties to which have a vested beneficial interest, and those only, it has been 
said, are the objects about which the constitution is solicitous, and to which its protection is extended.”); 
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810); Gregory S. Alexander, The Limits of Freedom of Contract in the Age 
of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 103, 103 (F. H. 
Buckley ed., 1999). 
99 There must be substantial impairment.  Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992). 
100 United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 17 n.13 (citing Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 322–26 
(1866); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390–91 (1798)). 
101 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“The Constitution does not speak of 
freedom of contract.  It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. 
In prohibiting that deprivation the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty.”); 
Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 578 (2009). 
102 Alexander, supra note 98, at 103. 
103 United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 16. 
104 Id. at 14–15. 
105 Id. at 16.  The Court was motivated partly by the unfairness to the bondholders who were powerless 
against the state that issued the bonds and changed the laws.  Id. at 29 n.27.  When fairness issues come 
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importance again and parties elected to implement a choice of time of law provision in 
their agreement, it should be more likely to be enforced. 
¶27 Alternatively, another perspective is that the Supreme Court adopted language in 
some of its modern decisions that is particularly relevant to a choice of time of law 
clause: 
The obligation of a contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their 
agreement.  This Court has said that ”the laws which subsist at the time and place 
of the making of a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and form a 
part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms.  This 
principle embraces alike those which affect its validity, construction, discharge 
and enforcement.  Nothing can be more material to the obligation than the means 
of enforcement.  The ideas of validity and remedy are inseparable, and both are 
parts of the obligation, which is guaranteed by the Constitution against 
invasion.”106 
A contract includes not only its express terms but also the contemporaneous state law 
pertaining to interpretation and enforcement as if they were expressly referred to or 
incorporated by its terms.107  “This principle presumes that contracting parties adopt[ed] 
the terms of their bargain in reliance on the law in effect at the time the agreement [was] 
reached.”108  Although the cases relate mostly to contracts where the state government is 
a party, the Court’s statements about the law-at-the-time rule seemingly can be applied to 
both private and public contracts.109  Moreover, lower federal courts have also 
 
into play because a governmental party altered or even rescinded its own obligations retroactively, a court 
will apply heightened scrutiny.  See, e.g., S. California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 
(9th Cir. 2003); Sanitation & Recycling Indus. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 992–93 (2d Cir. 1997). 
106 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429–30 (1934) (citing Sturges v. 
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 197 (1819), and quoting Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535, 550, 
552 (1866)) (emphasis added).  The Court almost appeared to be wringing its hands, trying to rationalize 
why they veered away from the usual rule (quoted) for contracts.  It presented some distinction between the 
obligation of the contract and the remedy given by the legislature to enforce that obligation.  However, 
courts sometimes no longer make this distinction regarding contracts.  See City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 
U.S. 497, 508 n.9 (1965).  However, the distinction could still be useful, especially for patent licenses 
where the remedies are sometimes bifurcated from other patent issues.  Any choice of law and choice of 
time provision may be refined so that one set of laws are selected for the obligation portion of the contract 
and another set of laws for the remedy. 
107 United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 19 n.17. 
108 Id. (emphasis added) (preventing bondholders from losing the value in their bonds when the state 
itself repealed its past law and did away with its contractual obligation to secure the bonds with a minimum 
amount of reserve funds). 
109 El Paso, 379 U.S. at 508 (referring to all contracts and not just governmental contracts).  The 
Supreme Court refers to the laws at the time in several decisions related to contracts.  For example, in 1941, 
in Wood, the Supreme Court stated that “laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a 
contract . . . enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its 
terms.”  Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 370 (1941).  The Court decided that Arkansas Act 264, repealing 
Act 142 that forgave property taxes effectively voided the state’s contracts with a seller, contracts which 
were made during the existence of Act 142.  Id. at 371.  The Court held the state violated the Contract 
Clause and the obligations under the original Act 142 must apply.  Id.  Later, in 1977, the Court again 
alluded to the concept of laws at the time of contract in order to prevent bondholders from losing the value 
in their bonds when the state itself repealed its past law and did away with its contractual obligation to 
secure the bonds with a minimum amount of reserve funds.  United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 18–19, 32.    
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occasionally applied the law-at-the-time rule to purely private contracts.110  The federal 
courts balance contract rights against public policy, emergency circumstances, and 
equitable principles.111  Even when a decision goes against contract rights in the 
balancing act, the decisions often mention the law-at-the-time rule.112  As such, one might 
conclude from the decisions and the rule that parties could adopt a choice of time of law 
clause in their contracts and enforce it. 
¶28 It is more common for courts to sua sponte assert a prior law—one existing at the 
time of contract formation such as stated in United States Trust—but at least one 
Supreme Court case referenced future regulations.  Mastrobuono v. Shearson was a 
private contract case where the Court was implicitly receptive to a choice of time of 
law.113  The Court gave effect to contract language where the parties chose future finance 
semi-administrative regulations to govern an agreement between plaintiff investor and 
defendant stock-brokerage firms.114  The language in question was: “Unless 
unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of or relating to 
[my] accounts, . . . shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules then in 
effect . . . as I may elect.”115  (emphasis added).  The Court decided, “The arbitral award 
 
110 For example, in a private contract case, the Third Circuit permitted the defendant Hess Oil to revert 
to a prior law existing at the time of contract to continue relying on an old doctrine known as “borrowed 
employees” that applies to contract workers.  Nieves v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 819 F.2d 1237, 1253 
(3d Cir. 1987).  The lawsuit was already pending in court when new legislation eliminating the doctrine 
was enacted.  Id.  There was a retroactive-application provision of the new statute, stating the new law was 
to apply even to the suits that had already been filed under the old law for four of the contract employees.  
Id. at 1250.  The Third Circuit held the alleged public purposes of the retroactive application provision and 
the means chosen to accomplish them violated the Contract Clause.  Id. at 1252.  The old doctrine of 
“borrowed employees” thus continued to apply to the workers who were contracted under the old doctrine.  
See also Ocean View Towers Assocs. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 169, 176  (Fed. Cl. 2009) (regarding 
rent contracts, the court stated, “contracting parties are nonetheless ‘presumed to be aware of applicable 
statutes and to intend to incorporate them.’”); Dart Advantage Warehousing, Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed. 
Cl. 694, 700 (2002) (regarding warehouse space contracts with the U.S. Postal Service, the court stated, 
“parties are presumed to be aware of applicable statutes and intend to incorporate them” into the contract 
together with rules and regulations which are considered to be contemporaneous circumstances.); Puerto 
Rico Dep't of Labor & Human Res. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 24 (Fed. Cl. 2001) (interpreting a 
settlement agreement); Shell Oil Co. v. M/T Gilda, 790 F.2d 1209, 1212 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986) (“This Bill of 
Lading shall have effect subject to the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts of the United 
States, approved April 16, 1936 . . . .”); Markwell's Estate v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 112 F.2d 253, 
254 (7th Cir. 1940) (regarding taxes and a contract between divorced spouses).  
111 American courts are also courts of equity.  THE GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW: EVERYONE’S LEGAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 370 (1984) (federal courts were empowered to sit either in equity or at law until 1938 when 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure established one system for processing both law and equity cases, and 
all actions became “civil” actions.). 
112 Compare Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448 (1934) (suspending private 
contract obligations because of hardships during the Great Depression), with United States Trust Co., 431 
U.S. at 21 (upholding contract rights).   
113 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59 (1995). 
114 Id. at 58 n.2.  The rules refer to semi-administrative law, the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure.   
115 Id. (“This agreement shall inure to the benefit of your [Shearson's] successors and assigns[,] shall be 
binding on the undersigned, my [petitioners'] heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, and shall be 
governed by the laws of the State of New York.  Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any 
controversy arising out of or relating to [my] accounts, to transactions with you, your officers, directors, 
agents and/or employees for me or to this agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in 
accordance with the rules then in effect, of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the 
Boards of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and/or the American Stock Exchange Inc. as I 
may elect.”) (emphasis added).  In 2007, the NASD merged with the New York Stock Exchange's 
regulation committee to form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, or FINRA.  See Securities 
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should have been enforced as within the scope of the contract.”116  Thus, this precedent 
implicitly condones a contractual choice of time of law in private contracts. 
¶29 Finally, it is important to note that when the courts refer to the “laws at the time,” 
they refer to all areas of law that may affect a particular contract and not merely contract 
law—i.e., it may be food regulations, patent law, procedural rules, or any matter that is 
related to the subject of the contract.  In fact, the Supreme Court described this scenario 
in a case dealing with to appellate-procedure rules, finding that the appellate-procedure 
rules impacted a contract and were thus subject to the laws at the time of contract rule.117  
As such, parties considering a choice of time of law clause should consider all types of 
laws and strategically select only certain sets of laws under the choice of time of law 
provision.118 
¶30 In sum, the federal courts have held that laws existing at the time a contract is 
formed and where the contract is performed are treated as if they were expressly 
incorporated in the contract.119  A logical extension of these decisions is that a choice of 
time of law provision may actually be expressly drafted into a contract, where the parties’ 
intent is to enforce the contract under then-existing law or even future law.  
B. Compatibility with State Contract Law 
¶31 Although federal courts adopted the concept that “the laws which subsist at the 
time . . . [are] as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated,”120 a bigger concern is 
whether state courts would enforce a choice of time of law clause in a contract because 
contracts are generally governed by state law.  For one thing, states do not have uniform 
laws.  Also, some states apparently do not adhere to the federal concept in contract 
cases.121  Consequently, it is even more important for parties to include an express 
provision because contracts largely governed by state law.  Such a provision may well 
deter a court’s attempt to defeat the party’s original choice.  Fortunately, state contract 
law, like federal constitutional law, contains a basis for adopting and enforcing an 
express choice of time of law clause. 
¶32 U.S. contract law comes primarily from state common law (represented by the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts) and state statutory law (modeled after the Uniform 
 
Regulations Advice for the Individual Investor, SEC, NASD, AND SECURITIES LAW INFORMATION CENTER, 
http://www.sec-nasd-regulations.com/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).   
116 Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 64. 
117 In Digital Equipment, a petitioner tried to appeal a lower court’s decision related to a private 
contract.  Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 876–77 (1994).  The Court concluded 
the particular order is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Id.  When the petitioner argued that section 
1291 should be ignored because the petitioner held an express right by contract not to be subjected to trial 
by the other party, the Court pointed out, “[T]he laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a 
contract . . . enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly referred to . . . in its terms.”  Id. at 876 
n.5 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429–30).  That is, section 1291 existed 
even at the time of contract and it did not allow an appeal of the order.   
118 This is a technique already practiced in international contracts where parties attempt to avoid the 
most-rapidly changing or disadvantageous laws.  See infra Section III.C. 
119 United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. N.J., 431 U.S. 1, 19, n. 17 (1977) (citing Home Bldg., 290 U.S. at 
429–30 (quoting Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535, 550 (1867))).    
120 Home Bldg., 290 U.S. at 430–31.  See discussion supra note 106. 
121 See examples supra Introduction and Section II. 
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Commercial Code).122  Although specialized law governs some types of contracts,123 
there are fundamental principles that are common to most types of contracts.124  For 
example, freedom to contract is fundamental to all contracts, including sale of goods 
contracts and patent licenses.125  Due partly to shared fundamental principles, it is 
possible to demonstrate the general applicability of the proposed solution. This paper 
examines the feasibility of the choice of time of law concept for both goods and 
patents.126  The same concepts should be extendable even to other types of contracts.  
Sale of goods contracts are governed by the U.C.C. Art. 2 (“UCC2”).127  Patent licenses, 
on the other hand, are governed by traditional common law because patents are not 
“goods.”128  Also, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts theoretically provides a 
reasonable basis for patent license law.129  
 
¶33 The two laws, UCC2 and the Restatement, presumably share some common 
fundamental principles.  They were both drafted partly by the same group, but the UCC2 
tends to favor legislation while the Restatement tends to favor common law.130  The most 
122 U.C.C. § 1-103 (2009) (Official Comment 3); CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 87, at § 1.21.  
123 JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., 1-1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS DESK EDITION § 1.01 (2009). 
124 U.C.C. art. 2; JOHN E. MURRAY, 1-1 MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 8 (4th ed. 2001) (“Sources and 
Theories–Classical, Neoclassical et al.”); CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 87, at § 1.21 (“There are 
legal questions common to all of these transactions,” but that “[t]here are also questions unique to each 
kind of transaction, the business context of maritime charters requires that special rules should apply that 
do not apply to a contract for sale of a house”). 
125 See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 87, § 1.1 (“The Main Purpose of Contract Law Is the 
Realization of Reasonable Expectations Induced by Promises”); infra note 126. 
126 Patent licenses are peculiar because not only are patents not “goods,” they are anti-goods.  They 
provide a limited right to exclude someone from making the goods, the patented invention; they do not 
provide a right to make the goods.  Compare Lamle v. Mattel, Inc., 394 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(citing Novamedix, Ltd. v. NDM Acquisition Corp., 166 F.3d 1177, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1999)), and 35 U.S.C. 
§ 154(a)(1), and Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852) (emphasis added), and TransCore, LP v. 
Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 1271, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2009), with 35 U.S.C. § 261 
(Ownership; assignment: “[p]atents shall have the attributes of personal property.”). 
127 HULL, supra note 29, at 3. 
128 See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (involving a license contract 
for a keyholder design, the court stated “[c]ommercial agreements traditionally are the domain of state 
law.”); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 661 (1969) (noting “the California Supreme Court's construction 
of the 1955 licensing agreement was decided solely as a matter of state law”); Imation Corp. v. Koninklijke 
Philips Elecs. N.V., 586 F.3d 980, 985 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Power Lift, Inc. v. Weatherford Nipple-Up 
Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“A license agreement is a contract governed by ordinary 
principles of state contract law.”)). 
129 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch.1, intro., § 201(1), § 202(5) (1981) (“Wherever 
reasonable, the manifestations of intention of the parties to a promise or agreement are interpreted as 
consistent with each other and with any relevant course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of 
trade.”); Epistar Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 566 F.3d 1321, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating that the 
settlement agreement binds the parties, as understood and intended by them); Lamle, 394 F.3d at 1364 
(relying on the Restatement for the definition of the completeness of a patent license). 
130 The American Law Institute drafted the Restatement and, together with National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, drafted the U.C.C.  E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON 
CONTRACTS Vol. I, 31–32, 41 (3d ed. 2004)(“[S]ince the creative forces of contract law had traditionally 
been judicial rather than legislative, scholars tended to regard contract law as essentially case law and to 
seek these generalities in judicial decisions. . . .  This emphasis on case law was reinforced by the American 
Law Institute. . . .  [T]he Institute undertook to reduce the mass of case law to a body of readily accessible 
rules in the form of a Restatement of the Law . . . .”  In contrast, “The origins of the U.C.C. lie in the law 
merchant, a specialized body usages, or customs, that governed contracts dealing with commercial matters 
until the seventeenth century.”) [hereinafter FARNSWORTH].  Finally, Corbin unites the two.  “While it is a 
statute that courts must apply, the interpretation, application, and construction of the sections of Article 2 
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important legislation affecting contract law was the enactment of UCC2,131 which has 
been adopted by all states except Louisiana.132 On the other hand, the Restatement is only 
persuasive authority.133   
¶34 Both the UCC2 and the Restatement arguably allow a provision for parties to select 
a choice of time and of law of a state.  U.C.C. § 1-301, applicable to UCC2, expressly 
permits contracting parties to select a territorial choice of law—the provision does not 
even require a “reasonable relation” to the chosen state.134  Also, U.C.C. § 1-302(a) 
suggests it may be possible to expand territorial choice of law to include a choice of time 
of law because § 1-302(a) allows “variation by agreement.”  Not only can parties “change 
the legal consequences that would otherwise flow from the provisions of the U.C.C.,” but 
the Official Comments state, “Subsection (a) states affirmatively at the outset that 
freedom of contract is a principle of the Uniform Commercial Code.”135  By contrast, the 
Restatement itself does not have a provision on choice of law; rather, the official 
comments of various sections refer to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, 
which does permit freedom to choose by contract.136  Chapter 8 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, which is most relevant to choice of law, states that contract terms 
or provisions are prohibited only when they violate public policy.137  If there is no 
intractable violation, “[i]n general, parties may contract as they wish, and courts will 
enforce their agreements without passing on their substance.”138  These aspects suggest 
that neither the UCC nor the Restatement pose any real obstacle to a choice of time of 
law clause.  
¶35 Moreover, recent case law confirms the foregoing of the more liberal provisions 
and comments in the UCC2 and the Restatement.  For example, in patent licensing, most 
of the reported cases enforce contractual choices of law, unless the choice violates a 
fundamental public policy of the forum state.139  Some decisions even relate the rights of 
contract law directly with the right to choose the particular law with which to interpret 
and enforce the contract.  Applying state contract and choice of laws, the Fourth Circuit 
stated, “[P]arties enjoy full autonomy to choose controlling law with regard to matters 
within their contractual capacity.”140  Likewise, the Tenth Circuit expressed,  
Because conflicts of law are inevitable in a federal system, parties to a contract 
are empowered to and frequently do choose a particular state's law to apply to the 
 
continue to manifest a common law approach consistent with the views of the principal draftsman of 
Article 2.”  CORBIN ON CONTRACTS DESK EDITION, supra note 123, § 1.01. 
131 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS DESK EDITION, supra note 123 at § 1.01; Karl N. Llewellyn, Why We Need 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 367, 378 (1957). (“[T]he heart of the code . . . is Article 
2.”). 
132 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS DESK EDITION, supra note 123 at § 43; HULL, supra note 29, at 3. 
133 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS DESK EDITION, supra note 123 at § 1.01. 
134 U.C.C. § 1-301 (2009) (Territorial Applicability; Parties' Power to Choose Applicable Law; Official 
Comments: Summary of changes from former law). 
135 Id. at § 1-302 (Variation by Agreement).  
136 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).  See supra Sections III.D and IV for 
discussion. 
137 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178, ch. 8 (Unenforceability due to public policy). 
138 Id. ch. 8, intro. 
139 RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW § 2:58 (2009). 
140 Barnes Grp., Inc. v. C & C Prods., Inc., 716 F.2d 1023, 1029 n.10 (4th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). 
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execution and interpretation of the contract.  Absent special circumstances, courts 
usually honor the parties’ choice of law because two ‘prime objectives’ of 
contract law are ‘to protect the justified expectations of the parties and to make it 
possible for them to foretell with accuracy what will be their rights and liabilities 
under the contract.’141 
Many state court decisions have expressed that the primary objectives of contract law are 
to enable the parties to fulfill their expectations and give them the ability to predict the 
outcome of their contract with accuracy.142  
¶36 Finally, like the federal decisions in United States Trust or Home Building, some 
state court decisions also provide that “[t]he laws that are in force at the time parties enter 
into a contract are merged with the other obligations that are specifically set forth in the 
agreement.”143  Aside from Pennsylvania, at least ten other state courts made similar 
statements.144  Both Pennsylvania and Illinois adopted an even more aggressive stance 
finding that “[a]ny law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention 
of the parties . . . [or] imposing conditions not expressed therein or dispensing with the 
performance of those which are a part of it, impairs its obligation, whether the law affects 
the validity, construction, duration, or enforcement of the contract.”145  The parties are 
presumed to be aware of applicable statutes and to intend to incorporate them.146  Given 
these sentiments, at least a number of states arguably would enforce a choice of time of 
law clause, especially a “freezing” clause, which selects laws existing at the time the 
contract was executed. 
¶37 In sum, a logical extension of the presently enforceable choice of law provision 
should include adding a provision to select the choice of time of law based on existing 
law or on future law.  Such a technique would further fulfill the parties’ expectations and 
aid their ability to predict the outcome of their contract with accuracy as supported by 
state contract law. 
 
141 Boyd Rosene & Assocs., Inc. v. Kansas Mun. Gas Agency, 174 F.3d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(emphasis added).  See also Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 428 (10th Cir. 2006).  Similarly, the 
Sixth Circuit agreed with the Tenth; see Meijer, Inc. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., No. 94-1152, 1995 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 19951 at *8 (6th Cir. July 21, 1995). 
142 See, e.g., MCS Servs., Inc. v. Coronel, No. 289729-V, 2008 WL 2400867 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 4, 
2008); Erwin v. Cotter Health Ctrs., Inc., 167 P.3d 1112 (Wash. 2007); Hall v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 876 
N.E.2d 1036 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); Modroo v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. DV-03-620, 2004 Mont. 
Dist. LEXIS 3724, at *16 (Mont. Dist. Feb. 9, 2004); Register v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Nos. C-
020318, 2003 WL 1571597, ¶ 10 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2003). 
143 Empire Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 684 A.2d 1047, 1059 (Pa. 1996) (citing Walsh v. Sch. 
Dist. of Phila., 22 A.2d 909 (Pa. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942)). 
144 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 87, § 24.26 (citing cases from OK, AK, MD, FL, UT, CO, MO, 
NM, OH, WY).  Sometimes, states’ decisions hold that the laws are implied in the contracts.  Id. § 24.26 
n.533. 
145 Parsonese v. Midland Nat'l Ins. Co., 706 A.2d 814, 816 (Pa. 1998) (emphasis added).  Like the U.S. 
Constitution, state constitutions sometimes expressly do not permit retroactive application of legislation.  
See, e.g., id. at 819; Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, 483 N.E.2d 226 (Ill. 1985). 
146 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 87, § 24.26, n.535 (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. 
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)). 
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C. Laws Regarding Stabilization Clauses in International Contracts 
¶38 Pioneering concepts tend to be met with opposition.  There is evidence of this in 
both contract and patent law.  Even after many years, the 2003 amendments to U.C.C. 
Articles 2 and 2A have yet to be adopted by any state.147  UCC Article 2B, which 
governed intellectual property licenses, has died altogether.148  Also, the revised 2007 
Patent Reform Bill is still winding its way through Congress in 2011.149  Fortunately, 
there already exist real-life examples of contract provisions that include a choice of time 
of law in international contracts.  As such, there is evidence that the concept at least 
works to some extent.  Also, international contracts provide useful insights as to how the 
clauses should be implemented domestically. 
¶39 Among international contracts, there are so-called “stabilization” clauses that 
attempt to overcome the application of new legislation that may be inconsistent with the 
terms of a preexisting contract.150  The provision is implemented proactively to reduce 
the risk to investors doing business in developing nations that have fluctuating governing 
laws.151  Because these international contracts are usually between a large private 
company, like Exxon-Mobil and a foreign state in control of the minerals of that country 
(e.g. oil fields),152 the state potentially has the authority to revise laws in an arbitrary 
manner.153  The concerns in the international situation are similar to those in United 
States Trust, where the Supreme Court held that a state may not revise the laws in a way 
that relieves the state of its previous contractual obligations.154  Among international 
circles, there is some resistance toward the use of stabilization clauses due to socio-
political and anti-sovereignty implications.155  However, there are also persuasive 
 
147 HULL, supra note 29, at 3. 
148 See generally Peter B. Maggs, The Effect of Proposed Amendments to Uniform Commercial Code 
Article 2, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 311 (2002). 
149 Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform Moving Forward, PATENTLYO (Feb. 25, 2010, 4:16 PM), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/02/patent-reform-moving-forward.html. 
150 See, e.g., SHEMBERG, supra note 31; Lorenzo Cotula, Regulatory Takings, Stabilization Clauses and 
Sustainable Development, OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (Mar. 27, 2008), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/8/40311122.pdf. 
151 See, e.g., Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Book Reviews and Notes, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 669, 701 (1983) 
(reviewing PATRICK COURBE, LES OBJECTIFS TEMPORELS DES REGLES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 
(1981)).  Patrick Courbe was one of the earliest proponents of time of law clauses in various types of 
international contracts.   
152 J. Nna Emeka, Anchoring Stabilization Clauses in International Petroleum Contracts, 42 INT’L LAW 
1317, 1318–19 (2008). 
153 Some foreign governments confiscate the development equipment and oil production despite the 
existence of a contract.  Id. at 1319–20 (citing examples in Russia, the government of Vladimir Putin 
acquired Gazprom and revoked a permit for a Shell oil and gas project; in Chad, the government demanded 
that international operators Chevron, Exxon, and Petronas renegotiate their revenue share; in Venezuala, 
President Hugo Chavez took control of the formerly independent Petroleos de Venezuala, forcing out 
Exxon and Conoco-Phillips; in Bolivia and Ecuador, the governments nationalized the oil and gas fields 
and assumed control of the holdings of Occidental).  Thus, the stabilization clauses in contracts sometimes 
proved ineffective, internationally, because the foreign state is the sole or at least primary decision maker. 
154 When a state is party to a contract, the courts apply heightened scrutiny out of concerns of unfairness.  
United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29 (1977) (applying a “reasonable and 
necessary” standard). 
155 The clauses continue to be used in modern day practice in mining contracts, including oil and gas in 
Africa, Eastern and Southern Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East and Latin America.  SHEMBERG, supra 
note 31, at ix; Cotula, supra note 150, at 4.  The way it works is that some foreign states dangle fiscal 
incentives to attract investments.  Emeka, supra note 152, at 131.  A private company then commits much 
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counterarguments that justify their use.156  In addition, international arbitral tribunals 
have upheld the stabilization provision by reason that a country’s entry into a contract is 
itself an exercise of sovereignty.157  In any case, this paper considers only domestic 
contracts between purely-private parties, which are unlike international contracts between 
a foreign ruling state and a private investor.158  Thus, some of the international problems 
would not exist in the domestic context, and therefore and a choice of time of law clause 
would be workable.159 
 
¶40 In international contracts, there are different types of stabilization clauses: freezing, 
hybrid and economic equilibrium clauses.160  With freezing clauses in contracts, “the 
applicable . . . law is the one in force at the time the contract is concluded, to the 
exclusion of subsequent legislation.”161  By contrast, hybrid clauses permit an adaptation 
mechanism where the foreign state compensates the investor should subsequent 
legislation increase the investor’s financial burden.162  Lastly, equilibrium clauses link 
any alterations to the scope of the contract, which are due to changes in the law, to 
contract renegotiations in order to restore its original economic intent.163  Equilibrium 
clauses create inherent uncertainty because parties might not reach a new agreement 
altogether, which is a scenario that goes against the purpose of the proposed solution of 
this paper.164  Therefore, only the other two types of clauses are considered in this paper. 
capital, expertise and technology know-how that remains with the foreign state even after the project.  Id.  
A contract with a stabilization clause is negotiated between the state and the private company.  But, people 
in developing nations are rather angry with the practice, feeling trapped into accepting stabilization 
provisions in order to get investment dollars.  SHEMBERG, supra note 31, at vii (“Concerns about 
stabilization clauses and human rights arose in . . . 2003 when the oil company BP published its private 
investment contracts relating to a major cross-border pipeline project.”).  The argument is that these clauses 
are contrary to the concept of sovereignty of the host country.  Cotula, supra note 150, at 3–4.  The concern 
is decades old.  See, e.g., Hugh A. Rawlins, Aspects of the UNCITRAL Regimes for Procurement and for 
International Commercial Arbitration, and Government International Commercial Contracts in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, 7 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 41, 72–73 (1997).  Moreover, the clauses may 
exempt investment projects even from new laws aimed at protecting human rights.  SHEMBERG, supra note 
31, at viii. 
156 Rather than stepping on sovereignty, the argument is that because a state itself is making the contract, 
“a State may not invoke the cloak of sovereignty to disavow earlier commercial contractual commitments.”  
Emeka, supra note 152, at 1324. 
157 Id.  
158 Indeed, both private parties in domestic contracts are equally at the mercy of whatever new laws may 
arise in the U.S.  A new law or court decision may disadvantage either party with equal probability in the 
U.S.  As a result, this avoids any negative aspects associated with the international contracts.  Moreover, 
U.S. courts can apply the paper’s proposed Test in U.S. contract disputes and objectively check whether a 
time of law a provision (i.e. the contract) could be enforced, all in a neutral fashion without favoring either 
party at the outset. 
159 Christopher T. Curtis, The Legal Security of Economic Development Agreements, 29 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 317, 336–38 (1988) (arguing why governments should not interfere with stabilization clauses used in 
international contracts). 
160 SHEMBERG, supra note 31, at 17–19. 
161 Cotula, supra note 150, at 6. 
162 Emeka, supra note 152, at 1321. 
163 Cotula, supra note 150, at 6. 
164 The economic equilibrium flavor of stabilization could also be useful in domestic contracts, but only 
in limited situations.  First, the international contracts span about forty years or more and involve very large 
investments.  Emeka, supra note 152, at 1318.  Unless a domestic contract is that long in duration and that 
expensive, it seems impractical to make the choice of time provision overly complicated to include the 
possibility of a renegotiation.  Patents, for example, last less than twenty years and technology becomes 
obsolete quickly; so patent licenses may last only ten years or less.  Second, while the economic 
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¶41 A hybrid stabilization contract clause may be of great utility in domestic affairs 
because the contract is preserved when there are new laws.  The parties would follow the 
new laws in interpreting and executing the contract, but one party may have to indemnify 
the other for additional costs incurred.  There are domestic contract attorneys who favor 
the hybrid approach or practice it to some extent already.165  The method is akin to 
provisions in contracts that attempt to allocate and shift risks by providing for future 
contingencies.166  For example, food makers negotiate contracts to buy food-packages 
and prefer that package manufacturers make up the difference in price if the tax rate 
changes or if the packages have to meet new safety regulations.167  A better-known 
example occurs in construction contracts, where new regulations may require an edifice 
be built to new specifications.168  If meeting the new specifications entails significant cost 
overruns, both parties might share in the costs if their original contract had been 
presciently drafted with all possible new regulations in mind.169  In these situations, a 
choice of time of law provision could serve the contracting parties well in anticipating all 
changes; then, if laws do change the parties could agree a priori to a shared cost 
adjustment formula based on, for example, a threshold cost increase.170  
 
equilibrium contracts have grown in popularity internationally, renegotiating a contract is fraught with 
perils.  For one thing, what is the threshold for mandating a renegotiation?  For another, the parties may not 
reach a new agreement, particularly if the law has changed so much so as to invalidate their contract or 
revise its scope drastically.  Other than good faith, there may not be anything left to encourage the parties to 
form a new contract.  SHEMBERG, supra note 31, at 6.  For instance, if the previously-licensed patent 
suddenly became invalid as a result of Bilski or KSR, there is no incentive whatsoever for the licensee to 
continue with a license.  If the parties cannot reach a new agreement, perhaps they would necessarily have 
to submit to arbitration or go to court.  This prospect and the general uncertainty of economic equilibrium 
contracts in the event of new law defeat the entire purpose of the proposed solution in this paper—to have 
some mechanism by contract to provide contracting parties more certainty, stability, and peace of mind 
after they entered into a contract.  The goal is to reduce litigation, arbitration, and uncertainty. 
165 Interview with Susan Chao, supra 74.  In small mom and pop deals—such as around-the-house 
construction projects for a new kitchen, etc.—parties may very well renegotiate costs if something 
unexpected happens—such as when the economy collapsed and so on.  
166 See George G. Triantis, Unforeseen Contingencies: Risk Allocation in Contracts, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS, 100 (1999), http://encyclo.findlaw.com/4500book.pdf. 
167 Interview with Susan Chao, supra note 74. 
168 See Viacom, Inc. v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 649, 663 (Fed. Cl. 2006) (“[W]here the pension costs 
are attributable to contracts that were entered into before the effective date of the revised CAS 413, either 
the contractor or the government is entitled to an equitable adjustment to the extent that the contractor or 
the government is liable for more under the revised CAS 413 than they would have been liable for under 
the original CAS 413.”); Kearfott Guidance & Navigation Corp. v. Rumsfeld, 320 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (contending that when a party enters into a contract with the government after a new regulation takes 
effect, the parties are bound by the new regulation).  Also, Boston’s Big Dig project has spiraled in costs 
from $2.6 billion to $14.8 billion.   
169 A cost overrun is often resolved by passing it to the consumer rather than to either party.  See, e.g., 
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 367 (1988) (describing how the cost of the 
nuclear power plant overran and the consumers utility bill had to be increased); Sovereign Bank v. BJ's 
Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2008).  In cost overrun cases in U.S. courts, the 
contracting parties raise many issues—i.e., good faith, deceptive practices, problems restructuring the 
contract—regarding the overrun. 
170 This kind of bargaining seems intuitively logical and reasonable.  Recently, my neighbor had to move 
out early due to a job change and she negotiated to pay part of her lease-breaking penalty.  The landlord 
agreed; so, my neighbor and landlord each gained and lost a bit of money.  However, if international cases 
are any lesson, a major study undertaken in 2008 for the World Bank and the United Nations states, “There 
appear to be no reported cases where economic equilibrium or hybrid clauses have been enforced in either 
private or international arbitration, so it is not clear how such clauses would be dealt with in the context of 
arbitration.”  SHEMBERG, supra note 31, at 37.  The study summarizes, “it is unclear how these clauses 
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¶42 Finally, a simple freezing clause may be the best solution.  However, even simple 
freezing clauses can be uncertain along multiple dimensions.  In the international context, 
there are full freezing clauses that attempt to freeze the application of both fiscal and non-
fiscal laws for the duration of the contract.  An example is: 
Specific Juridical Stability: The State guarantees . . . the Recipient Company that 
this Investment Contract . . . shall enjoy absolute legal stability in accordance 
with the Legal Framework in Effect. Accordingly, neither the Investment 
Contract, nor [other agreements] . . . may be modified unilaterally by laws or 
other dispositions from the State of any type that affect them or by changes in the 
interpretation or application thereof and each thereof in which the State is a party 
may only be modified by the mutual written agreement of the Parties that 
expressly evidences such modifications. 171   
In addition, there are limited freezing clauses that aim to protect the investor from a 
limited set of legislative actions.172  For example, the international clauses may refer only 
to tax and customs regulations.173  Other limited freezing clauses may simply list the 
types of laws that are pertinent to the contract, or list certain sets of exempt laws.174 
¶43 Although freezing clauses in the oil and gas industry have largely fallen out of use 
in favor of modern economic equilibrium clauses,175 this paper submits that their 
simplicity makes them more readily enforceable.  First, this is evidenced by the fact that 
the clauses were still used in about 16% of international contracts in the 1990s and 
2000s.176  Presumably, sophisticated corporate lawyers expect the freezing clause to be 
valid and enforceable at least to some extent.  Second, freezing clauses require less work 
than other stabilizing clauses.  The other types of stabilization clauses necessitate not 
only determining whether there is “new” law, but also adopting subsequent remedial 
action based on a fuzzy good faith standard when new laws do arise.  A freezing 
provision on the other hand, simply keeps the status quo.  The parties theoretically do not 
need to renegotiate the contract with the other party when new laws emerge.177 
¶44 In summary, for short-term contracts,178 this paper recommends freezing clauses for 
their simplicity or hybrid clauses for providing easily-calculated compensation schemes 
when detrimental laws do arise.179  For long-term contracts, the hybrid approach may be 
 
would be enforced formally and whether they would potentially result in monetary compensation.”  Id.  
Therefore, keeping the choice of time of law provision simple, certain and easily enforceable is a high 
priority.  A simple freezing clause may be the best bet initially in domestic contracts. 




175 Id. at 6–7. 
176 Id. at 20. 
177 The parties should have already obtained insurance to deal with cost overruns that may results from 
changes in law. 
178 An example is sale of food contracts.  Apparently, they are generally quite short in duration due to 
market fluctuations in food prices and stabilization clauses for changes in law seem unnecessary.  See 
Interview with Susan Chao, supra note 74. 
179 In the past, some researchers have questioned the enforceability of freezing clauses in either common 
law or civil law countries.  “Common law countries quite generally seem to adhere to principles which do 
not allow the parties to fetter by contract the executive powers of government or the legislative power of 
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more ideal.  Even though hybrid approaches to contracts are more difficult to negotiate, 
their long-term nature counterbalances the additional effort expended during the 
negotiation effort.  Additionally, the hybrid approach of stabilization appears to be 
favored internationally today.  
IV. COMPATIBILITY WITH THE RULES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 
¶45 Conflict of Laws rules are highly relevant to a choice of time of law clause, because 
the clause is essentially an extension of the traditionally-accepted choice of law provision 
in contracts.180  Conflict of Laws rules might very well govern a choice of time of law 
clause.  Unfortunately, the “Laws” are rather divergent among the different states.181  As 
a result, there are practical hurdles challenging the actual implementation of such clauses.  
This Section gives an overview of some obstacles, examines the traditional choice of law 
clause and the Restatement (Second) on the Conflict of Laws, and explains why the 
provisions in the Restatement should support a new, express choice of time of law clause.  
Finally, courts readily enforce the existing choice of law provisions for reasons of 
litigation efficiency; by the same rationale, a choice of time of law provision should find 
favor as well. 
¶46 The first obstacle to the implementation of a choice of time of law provision is the 
potential reluctance of practitioners to implement these provisions.  There are two camps 
of thought regarding even the traditional choice of law provision.  First, a majority of 
practitioners favor having a choice of law provision.182  “Choice of governing law is 
essential.  Absent such a choice, there may be circumstances under which the parties do 
not know if their conduct breaches the agreement, or what the available remedies for such 
a breach are.”183  Clearly, parties want to choose the particular state law that is most 
beneficial to them.  “The failure to include a choice of law provision means increased 
costs to clients and the judicial system, because without an effective selection by a party, 
choice of law provisions and choice of law rules are based on indeterminate and often 
 
the legislature . . . .”  Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment 
Commitments: International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 215, 235 (1996).  But, 
contrary to this concern is that freezing clauses have actually been upheld in international arbitration and 
sovereignty has not been transgressed.  See, e.g., id. at 267 (citing eight prominent cases).  A secondary 
benefit is that if these types of contracts are also implemented and upheld domestically, then the ones that 
Americans negotiate internationally are much stronger.  Domestic and international practices would be 
harmonized.  Foreign countries cannot complain that they are somehow being disadvantaged by American 
practices.  And at the same time, Americans gain an additional option in their ability and freedom to 
contract domestically. 
180 Scholars generally treat choice of law as one aspect of the study of conflict of laws, which centers on 
transactions that have legal implications involving more than one sovereign.  WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & 
WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (3d ed. 2002). 
181 See e.g., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 87, § 12.18; Harold P. Southerland, Sovereignty, Value 
Judgments, and Choice of Law, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 451, 452 (2000). 
182 This is at least true in patent licensing.  See NIMMER & DODD, supra note 139, § 2:58 (“In part 
because of the confusing and uncertain background law, most licenses specify what law governs disputes 
relating to a license.”).  See also, BRIAN G. BRUNSVOLD, DENNIS O’REILLY & D. BRIAN KACEDON, 
DRAFTING PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS 266 (6th ed. 2008). 
183 Ian N. Feinberg, Standard and Not So Standard Terms in Intellectual Property License Agreements 
(aka Boilerplate), 985 PLI/PAT 777, 809 (2009). 
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fact-intensive inquires [sic] by the courts.”184  This means lawyers will spend less time 
litigating; it would be thus “negligent” to not include such clauses.185  
¶47 Second, a minority of practitioners choose to not select a choice of law because 
these attorneys do not put much faith in the clauses believe that courts are unlikely to 
uphold them.186  However, the reality is that courts generally do uphold express clauses 
when not dealing with consumer or employment contracts.187  
¶48 Another concern over the implementation of choice of law provisions is the time 
and cost required to analyze which particular state laws are most beneficial to a party.188  
However, the merits of this concern are questionable, particularly when an attorney 
practices primarily in one area of law and should be familiar with the most beneficial 
state laws.  Yet another concern is that some parties fear they will be locked into a less 
beneficial law at the time of litigation.189  However, this is the very problem this paper 
proposes to solve.  Locking a contract into a particular law at the time of contract (i.e. 
freeze clause) should be beneficial, or at the very least more certain, so that an attorney 
may draft the other provisions of the contract knowing the law and including 
workarounds to any detrimental law that may exist.  Working on known problems seems 
far superior to gambling on an unknown state’s law, or worse, new laws that may be 
detrimental or may take years to settle.  Alternatively, if the laws existing at the time of 
contract are especially unfavorable, parties could contract to elect future anticipated law.  
For example, the Patent Reform bill that is now before Congress is expected to pass and 
impact damage awards and patent licensing.  Parties to a license can opt for this future 
law by contract.  In conclusion, unless the parties were not able to agree to a particular 
choice, there seems little reason not to include one.190 
¶49 The second issue is that even traditional choice of law rules diverge among the 
different states.  One divergent aspect is due to the fact that court decisions could hinge 
on whether the choice of law provisions are considered procedural or substantive 
matters.191  As such, throwing in yet another provision—a choice of time of law clause—
might compound the problems even further and thus prove challenging.  Intuitively, a 
 
184 David Hricik, Infinite Combinations: Whether the Duty of Competency Requires Lawyers to Include 
Choice of Law Clauses in Contracts They Draft for Their Clients, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DIS. RES. 
241, 242 (2004).    
185 See id. at 243 (citing Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2002: The 
Sixteenth Annual Survey, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 3 n.3 (2003) (publishing a study showing that judges had to 
resolve choice of law and conflict of laws problems in 2002)). 
186 Richard J. Bauerfeld, Note, Effectiveness of Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contract Conflicts of Law: 
Party Autonomy or Objective Determination?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1659, 1669–70 (1982).  
187 This is true in, for example patent licensing.  See NIMMER & DODD, supra note 139, § 2:59.  And the 
dearth of controversial cases over express provisions suggests that courts are amenable to them.  The 
annual survey provided by Dean Symeonides shows that the contract cases which do crop up are typically 
only consumer and employment cases, where there is naturally unequal bargaining power.  See Symeon 
Symeonides, Conflict of Laws, WILLAMETTE LAW ONLINE, 
http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/journals/wlo/conflicts/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2011). 
188 Dean Symeonides provides an annual study of the choice of law rules in each state to sort out the 
intricacies.  Id. 
189 Hricik, supra note 184, at 257. 
190 If parties know an issue will be contentious, perhaps parties will avoid or let the issue go. 
191 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 8, intro. (1971)(“Contracts is one of the most 
complex and most confused areas of choice of law.  This complexity results in part from . . . the many 
different kinds of contracts and of issues involving contracts and by the many relationships a single 
contract may have to two or more states.”). 
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choice of law seems procedural, but this is not always the case.192  Worse still, there is 
difficulty in ascertaining the rules from state to state and even from court to court, 
because the rules are almost entirely judge-made.193  Local courts within a state may even 
decide to use the rules and laws of another state for sometimes-obscure reasons,194 so it 
may be uncertain as to what the ultimate governing law might be.  Fortunately, most 
courts probably consider choice of law as a procedural issue, because forum courts have 
an interest in calling an issue “procedural” as a way of ensuring that the forum protects its 
own interest in the application of its own laws.195  On the other hand, the Constitution 
imposes some limitations on state powers to characterize an issue as procedural and then 
to determine the issue in accordance with its own local law.196  Also, the comments of 
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws section 122 expressly disclaim attempts to 
classify issues as substantive or procedural.197  Even so, as a result of these uncertainties, 
a choice of time of law clause is likely to inherit the problems that already exist with 
regular choice of laws rules.  Each court may try to individually resolve whether it 
 
192 Boyd Rosene & Assocs., Inc. v. Kansas Mun. Gas Agency, 174 F.3d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(“what is substantive or procedural for Erie purposes is not necessarily substantive or procedural for 
choice-of-law purposes”) (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726 (1988)); Imation Corp. v. 
Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V., 586 F.3d 980, 985 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“As the Agreement provides that it 
shall be ‘construed, governed, interpreted and applied in accordance with the laws of the State of New 
York,’ . . . this court will apply New York substantive law in interpreting the Agreement”) (citing Parental 
Guide of Texas, Inc. v. Thomson, Inc., 446 F.3d 1265, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2006)); RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, 
supra note 180, § 1 at 179 (“[T]he impact of the U.S. Constitution on conflict problems . . . is sometimes 
quite significant (e.g. jurisdiction) and sometimes hardly evident at all (e.g. choice of law).”). 
Intuitively, choice of time of law seems to be procedural.  Such clauses are unlike the substance of an 
agreement as the type and quantity of objects for sale, the duration, exclusivity of ownership, and so on.  
Also, the regular choice of law is a step in the procedure of deciding a case, along with the standard of 
review and other procedures.  Courts choose the appropriate law and then move to the merits of the case.  
See, e.g., Imation Corp., 586 F.3d at 985; Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 487 F.3d 1368, 1373 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (applying state law because the Settlement Agreement provides in Article 8.9 that it is to 
be interpreted under Minnesota law; the Court settled the procedural issues, and then moved on to the main 
discussion.).  But, intuition is not foolproof.  For example, local rules themselves, which are used to choose 
the appropriate law (or uphold the choice of law by contract), may be substantive.  Jeffrey D. Dunn, Texas 
Choice of Law Analysis for Contracts, 40 TEX. J. BUS. L. 37, 47 (2004).  “[I]f the court has determined that 
the matter is substantive, then it looks to the substantive law of the forum state, including its choice of law 
principles, to determine the applicable substantive law.”  Boyd Rosene, 174 F.3d at 1118. 
193 Southerland, supra note 181, at 452. 
194 For example, in Texas, the choice of law clause must be conspicuous.  Also, if the overall contract is 
for the sale of goods less than $50,000, the law of another state will be selected.  Dunn, supra note 192, at 
62–3. 
195 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 180, §§ 58–59 (“Substance—procedure dichotomy.  The courts 
have traditionally approached issues falling within the scope of the rule of this Section by determining 
whether the particular issue was ‘procedural’ and therefore to be decided in accordance with the forum's 
local law rule, or ‘substantive’ and therefore to be decided by reference to the otherwise applicable law. . . .  
To avoid encouraging errors of that sort, the rules stated in this Chapter do not attempt to classify issues as 
‘procedural’ or ‘substantive.’  Instead they face directly the question whether the forum's rule should be 
applied.”) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122, cmt. b (1971)). 
196 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 
(1930). 
197 The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws avoids classifying issues as “procedural” or 
“substantive,” instead querying whether local rules apply or not.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 comment. b.  “A court usually applies its own local law rules prescribing how 
litigation shall be conducted even when it applies the local law rules of another state to resolve other issues 
in the case.”  Id.  Also, “[c]ommonly, it is said that the forum will apply its own local law to matters of 
procedure and the otherwise applicable law to matters of substance.”  Id. at ch. 6, intro. note at 350.  
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considers a choice of time of law clause to be procedural or substantive.  Regardless, 
ideally, the choice of time of law provision would be adopted by many states198 as state 
legislation in order to harmonize the rules.199  This is a daunting prospect considering that 
only about twenty-three states have even adopted200 the Restatement (Second) of Conflict 
of Laws, which was finalized over forty years ago and could have unified the rules for the 
choice of law.201  
¶50 Aside from these obstacles, the principles underlying the choice of laws for 
contracts grow ever more liberal and thus a choice of time of law clause should still find 
favor among practitioners.202  Since Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws is 
accepted by about half the states, it is useful to examine the Restatement as being 
representative and authoritative.  Chapter 8 of the Restatement is devoted entirely to 
contracts.203  Sections 186 and 187 of Chapter 8 favor “party autonomy,” where parties 
can choose the law to govern “rights and duties” arising under contract.204  Party 
autonomy as expressed in section 187 appears to be a nearly universal principle in the 
United States.205  However, Chapter 8 also recognizes certain limitations as expressed in 
section 187 and these limitations would presumably also apply to a choice of time of law 
clause.206  Party autonomy is only true for those contract matters where parties have free 
choice, and not for matters beyond the parties’ contractual capacity.207  For instance, the 
chosen law, at the chosen time, should have some substantial relation to the contract.208  
 
198 As for federal courts, a federal trial court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply the law of the 
forum state to determine the choice of law.  See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 
(1941). 
199 JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, CONFLICTS LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTS (2000) (concluding that 
legislation to codify choice of law rules to govern contract-related issues is the best approach to harmonize 
the chaotic judicial decisions), available at http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/olc/conflict_report.pdf. 
200 See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009: Twenty-Third Annual 
Survey, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 227 (2010).  Alternatively, some states adopt only portions of the Restatement 
(Second) Conflict of Laws.  See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 192, at 39.  
201 Willis L.M. Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited, 34 MERCER L. REV. 501 
(1983).  Professor Reese of Columbia University was the Reporter for the project.  
202 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS Ch. 8, intro.  The Second Restatement liberalizes the 
First Restatement, which did not acknowledge any power in the parties to choose the applicable law.  This 
increased freedom is a positive indication that the Restatements (ALI) could conceivably favor a choice of 
time of law. 
203 See id. (“In the Restatement of this Subject, the term ‘contract’ is used to refer both to legally 
enforceable promises and to other agreements or promises which are claimed to be enforceable but are not 
legally so.”). 
204 Id. §§ 186, 187(1) (1971) (Section 186 states “Applicable Law Issues in contract are determined by 
the law chosen by the parties in accordance with the rule of § 187 and otherwise by the law selected in 
accordance with the rule of § 188.”).  See also RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 180, § 74(b)(3), at 224–
25. 
205 EUGENE F. SCOLES ET. AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 980 (4th ed. 2004).  This study also stated that 
subsection 1 of § 187 provides that, for issues that the parties “could have resolved by an explicit provision 
in their agreement,” the parties’ choice of law is not subject to any geographical or substantive limitations.  
206 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS Ch. 8, intro (“The present Chapter recognizes that 
the parties have [the power to choose the applicable law] subject to certain limitations (see § 187).”). 
207 See Bauerfeld, supra note 186, at 1660.  In this respect, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
parallels the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  Also, if a contract or term is unconscionable at the time 
the contract is made, a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the 
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to 
avoid any unconscionable result.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208. 
208 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (“Application of the law of the chosen 
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But, section 187(2) softens the substantial relation criterion to one where any “reasonable 
basis” exists for doing so.209  A good faith effort to create certainty by contract and to 
reduce future litigation costs arguably comprises a “reasonable basis”210 for 
implementing a choice of time of law provision. 
 
¶51 Further supporting a choice of time of law clause is the large amount of case law 
promoting the idea that the proper choice of law in a contract is the law that conforms to 
the parties’ intent and expectations.211  For example, the Eighth Circuit held that an anti-
waiver provision in the Minnesota Franchise Act was not sufficient to overcome 
Minnesota's countervailing policy of enforcing contractual choice of law provisions 212  
state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the 
chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the 
state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.”).  However, if the 
difference in policy between the chosen law and forum law is not significant, party autonomy may prevail.  
See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Manpower, Inc., 531 F.2d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 1976) (regarding business covenants 
not to compete).  
 Because of the substantial relation criteria, the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws is somewhat 
more restrictive than contract law.  Parties would be wise to have some contacts with the state whose laws 
they choose.  For instance, parties deciding to contract to gamble within the territory of a state that 
prohibits gambling probably cannot select the laws of, for example, Nevada.  See, e.g., Bauerfeld, supra 
note 186, at 1661 n.9 (citing Louis C. James, The Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties on the Validity of 
Conflict of Laws "Illegal Contracts"–Sunday, Gambling, Lottery, and Other Agreements, 8 AM. U. L. REV. 
67, 86 (1959)).  On the other hand, if they place bets with a Nevada company (place of performance), then, 
they should be able to select Nevada law, particularly if the contract is also contract there (place of 
contract).  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 188 (listing place of performance as a 
factor in determining the most significant relationship); Intercontinental Hotel Corp. (Puerto Rico) v. 
Golden, 203 N.E.2d 210 (N.Y. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 188 (1971) (stating 
the place of contract is a factor in determining the most significant relationship).  Regardless, the limitation 
should not matter to a choice of time of law unless the laws of the chosen state, by chance, changes in such 
a way as to critically affect the particular activity—say, the chosen state bans placing bets with Nevada 
companies altogether.  Other than this unlikely scenario, a choice of time of law should be an acceptable 
addition to the Restatement on Conflict of Laws. 
209 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. f; Farnsworth, supra note 130, at Vol. II, 
19–20, 41. 
210 Moreover, except for consumer contracts, the new revision of the U.C.C. has rendered even more 
innocuous the requirement for a “reasonable basis.”  SCOLES, supra note 205, at 982 (referring to U.C.C. 
§ 1-105 (2001)). 
211 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. g.  Also, absent contracts of adhesion, fraud 
or illegality, the Sixth Circuit upholds choice of law provisions.  See, e.g., Tele-Save Merch. Co. v. 
Consumers Distrib. Co., 814 F.2d 1120, 1122 (6th Cir. 1987); Macurdy v. Sikov & Love, P.A., 894 F.2d 
818 (6th Cir. 1990) (concerning fraud); Zogg v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 276 F.2d 861, 863 (2d Cir. 1960) 
(concerning adhesion contracts, particularly in the insurance field).  See also Ringling Bros.-Barnum & 
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Olvera, 119 F.2d 584, 586 (9th Cir. 1941) (allowing a party (a circus) to 
designate Florida state law, even though the party wandered from state to state and had little contacts with 
Florida); Wilkinson v. Manpower, Inc., 531 F.2d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 1976) (relying on the Restatement 
(Second) Conflict of Laws to uphold choice of law by contract if there are only small policy differences 
between the forum and the chosen state); Symeonides, supra note 187, at 5, (showing Illinois, within the 
Seventh Circuit adopted the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws that favors party autonomy).  But, the 
Second Circuit upholds the law selected by contract as long as the state selected has sufficient contacts with 
the transaction.  See, e.g., Fieger v. Pitney Bowes Credit Corp., 251 F.3d 386, 393 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Orient Overseas Container Lines (UK) Ltd., 230 F.3d 549, 556 (2d Cir. 2000)); 
Bauerfeld, supra note 186, at 1669–74 (stating that in New York cases, “[c]hoice-of-law clauses simply are 
not followed by the courts”). 
212 Modern Computer Sys., Inc. v. Modern Banking Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 734, 738–40 (8th Cir. 1989) (en 
banc).  The Minnesota legislature later superseded the court decision by revising the Franchise Act so that 
Minnesota residents cannot waive compliance with the Act by a contractual choice-of-law clause.  See 
Costa v. Carambola Partners, LLC, 590 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1151 (D. Minn. 2008). 
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¶52 Most notably, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld an express choice of law 
provision, which could portend good implications for a choice of time of law clause.  The 
Court held that despite the rules of the Federal Arbitration Acts, the FAA does not 
preempt state law where the private parties agreed in their contract to be bound by a 
choice of law provision.213  The Court’s rationale was that “we give effect to the 
contractual rights and expectations of the parties, without doing violence to the policies 
behind by the FAA.”214  The Court adopted similar views in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co.,215 which was then followed by the lower courts with enthusiasm.216  Although 
Bremen involved a forum selection clause in a private contract between American and 
German parties, the Court’s reasoning is relevant here.  The clause “was an effort to 
eliminate all uncertainty as to the nature, location, and outlook of the forum in which 
these companies of differing nationalities might find themselves.”217   
It is settled . . . that parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the 
jurisdiction of a given court . . . .  This approach is substantially that followed in 
other common-law countries including England.  It is the view advanced by noted 
scholars and that adopted by the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws.  It accords 
with ancient concepts of freedom of contract . . . .218   
Given these sentiments of the Court, it seems reasonable to infer that a choice of time of 
law clause in a contract would be judicially accepted.  Such a clause is a proactive 
solution consistent with the Court’s rationale of enforcing the parties’ intent to procure 
certainty through and during the execution of their contract.  
V. ACCEPTABLE TO PUBLIC POLICY 
¶53 Public policy concerns appear to be the only real obstacle to the adoption and 
enforcement of a choice of time of law clause in domestic contracts.  These concerns are 
inferred from how existing rules and laws are interpreted and enforced.219  For example, 
both contract law and conflict of laws rules are very liberal about enforcing choice of law 
clauses in accordance with the parties’ intent and expectations, unless the parties’ 
decisions violate a fundamental public policy.220  At the very least, any policy concerns 
 
213 Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477–79 (1989). 
214 Id. at 479. 
215 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13 n.15 (1972). 
216 See J. Zachary Courson, Survey: Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd.: A New Federal Standard—Applying 
Contracting Parties' Choice of Law to the Analysis of Forum Selection Agreements, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 
597, 603 (2008) (citing Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual 
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 307–13 (1988)). 
217 M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13 n.5. (emphasis added). 
218 Id. at 11–12 (emphasis added). 
219 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2) (1981) (“A contractual right can be 
assigned unless . . . (b) the assignment is forbidden by statute or is otherwise inoperative on grounds of 
public policy . . . .”).  From conversations with Professors Gregory Crespi (contract law) and Raymond 
Nimmer (intellectual property licensing), both also believe that public policy is the only obstacle. 
220 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1971) (“No action will be entertained on a 
foreign cause of action the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong public policy of the forum.”).  
This suggests that forums do not have to apply a law that violates its own local public policy, but note that 
the rule has a narrow application.  See id. § 90 cmt. c (The public policy must be a “strong” one.); id. 
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that apply to the traditional choice of law provisions would likely also apply to a choice 
of time of law provision.  This Section addresses the different possible types of policy 
concerns that may hinder the acceptance of a choice of time of law clause.  Then, this 
Section proposes a set of rules or test (“Test”) to gauge whether a choice of time of law 
provision should be enforceable.  The proposed Test can be applied by the courts to 
decide whether a choice of time of law clause should be enforceable in a particular 
contract case. 
¶54 Public policy varies from state to state221 and it is a potential obstacle222 that 
litigants might encounter in any type of court action.  Undoubtedly, parties would 
eventually encounter it if they attempted to enforce a choice of time of law clause in a 
contract.  Public policy is vague in that it is hard to define and anticipate in advance.  
Generally, it appears to be a “rule of reason”223 that, ironically, seems unreasonably 
fickle.224  For example, one observer thinks “public policy” is something that a court can 
invoke and magisterially sweep away the results called for by traditional rules and, 
usually without much explanation, apply its own law to achieve some desired result.225  
Even with existing choice of law clauses, Corbin provides many examples where courts 
balance whether to uphold a choice of law provision that might go against “policy” 
concerns.226  Such a clause is likely to be upheld as valid and enforceable, unless the 
 
§ 187(2)(b) (“The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be 
applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision 
in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either . . . application of the law of the chosen state would 
be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the interests of the 
chosen state . . . .”).  Note that public policy is so strong that it might even override a choice of law 
provision.  See also U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 1 (“The Uniform Commercial Code should be construed in 
accordance with its underlying purposes and policies.  The text of each section should be read in the light 
of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the Uniform Commercial Code as a 
whole, and the application of the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in 
conformity with the purposes and policies involved.”); SCOLES, supra note 205, at 986; FARNSWORTH, 
supra note 130, at Vol. II, 19–20 (An agreement with a choice of law governing the contract may be 
unenforceable if “there is no . . . reasonable basis for the parties' choice.”) (citing the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS  § 187(2)(a)) (1981). 
221 See, e.g., Boone v. Boone, 546 S.E.2d 191, 194 (S.C. 2001) (“Because interspousal immunity 
violates the public policy of South Carolina, we will no longer apply the lex loci delicti when the law of the 
foreign state recognizes the doctrine.”).  Examples of policy matters are stated in Nash v. Tindall Corp., 
650 S.E.2d 81, 83–84 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007) (“Under the ‘public policy exception,’ the Court will not apply 
foreign law if it violates the public policy of South Carolina.  Foreign law may not be given effect in this 
state if it is against good morals or natural justice.  Examples of cases against good morals and natural 
justice are ‘prohibited marriages, wagers, lotteries, racing, contracts for gaming or the sale of liquors, and 
others.’”).  
222 See Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 233–34 (1892) (In a patent contract case, the Court 
stated, “[i]t is impossible to define with accuracy what is meant by that public policy for an interference 
and violation of which a contract may be declared invalid.  It may be understood in general that contracts 
which are detrimental to the interests of the public as understood at the time fall within the ban.  The 
standard of such policy is not absolutely invariable or fixed, since contracts which at one stage of our 
civilization may seem to conflict with public interests, at a more advanced stage are treated as legal and 
binding.”).  State courts express the same.  See, e.g., Hearst-Argyle Props., Inc. v. Entrex Commc’n Servs., 
Inc., 778 N.W.2d 465, 472 (Neb. 2010) (“The power of courts to invalidate contracts for being in 
contravention of public policy is a very delicate and undefined power which should be exercised only in 
cases free from doubt.”). 
223 FARNSWORTH, supra note 130, at Vol. II, 12 (providing sections on public policy). 
224 See Pope Mfg. Co., 144 U.S. at 233–34.  
225 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 180, at 169. 
226 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 87, § 79.7. 
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forum state has a contrary public policy or other public interest.227  Likewise, in 
Comment (g) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, there is a warning that the 
policy must be substantial before courts may override the choice of law clause in the 
contract agreed to by the parties.228  Similarly, under contract law, the 2001 Revision of 
the U.C.C. promotes the same inclinations as the Restatement and allows courts fewer 
reasons to invalidate a choice of law clause.229  As such, it is reasonable to expect that 
most choice of law provisions are enforceable.  By extension, a choice of time of law 
clause should also be enforceable, and public policy issues should not pose a real obstacle 
if the parties intended to include the clause in their contracts.  Furthermore, as the 
following paragraphs show, an analysis of each type of public policy concern tends to 
show that many policy concerns are refutable anyway. 
¶55 There are two different categories of public policy that could restrict a choice of 
time of law clause.  The first category encompasses general concerns against enforcing 
such a clause.  These general concerns are perhaps better categorized as psychological 
barriers rather than policy issues.  They are akin to human nature’s general resistance to 
change.  The second category of public policy concerns encompasses issues that are fact 
specific, such as concerns against gambling and lotteries in a state.  For instance, Nevada 
laws permit such activities, whereas Utah laws do not. 
A. General Policy Concerns: A New Concept, Sovereignty and Efficiency Issues 
¶56 Among the first category of policy concerns is that there is a lack of knowledge as 
to the consequences of implementing a new clause or that there may be no general 
incentive to include a choice of time law provision in a contract.  However, at least in 
patent law, food laws, health regulations, civil procedures, and local rules, there are good 
reasons to include some time or freezing provision in a domestic contract.  From a policy 
perspective, there might be less of a reason to implement such clauses here in the United 
States.  In international contracts, there is a higher incentive because some foreign 
governments have been very unstable and the country might have changed its laws 
dramatically due to political turmoil.  By contrast, the U.S. law is relatively stable.  For 
instance, in contract law, the revised U.C.C. Article 2 (2003) has yet to be adopted in any 
state and a revised version of U.C.C. Article 2-B (1999) for information technology 
licenses has been adopted by only two states so far.230  In comparison, much of the 
1950’s version of U.C.C. Article 2 has been adopted by nearly all the states and has been 
fairly stable for about fifty years now.231  On the other hand, other areas of U.S. law, 
 
227 See id.  But, perhaps Restatement (Second) of Contracts has a lower threshold in determining 
whether public policy should prevail.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 178 (1981).  
However, a “choice of time of law” is closer in purpose to a choice of law provision than to other 
provisions and terms governed by the restatement.  Therefore, the threshold set out in the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws should be more applicable. 
228 For example, it cannot be based merely on technical requirements, such as, formalities of the statute 
of frauds, the need for consideration, or rules tending to become obsolete. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment g. 
229 SCOLES, supra note 205, at 961 (citing U.C.C. § 1-301) (2011). 
230 HULL, supra note 29, at 3.  See generally Maggs, supra note 148; Raymond T. Nimmer, Through the 
Looking Glass: What Courts and UCITA Say About the Scope of Contract Law in the Information Age, 38 
DUQ. L. REV. 255 (2000). 
231 HULL, supra note 29, at 3; Harry G. Kyriakodis, Past and Present ALI Projects, THE AMERICAN 
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which impinge on the objects under contract, are constantly evolving and this has caused 
uncertainty with existing contracts.  Thus, there is a need for a choice of time of law 
provision at least for some types of contracts. 
¶57 Another policy concern is whether a choice of time of law clause is contrary to the 
sovereign authority of states232 to legislate and the sovereign authority of the courts to 
interpret the law.233  One purpose of the federal and state governments is to provide order 
over society.  Governmental entities make new laws and people are expected to follow 
them.234  For example, the federal and state governments restrict the liberty to contract, 
such as, through consumer protection regulations.235  Further, the Supreme Court has 
stated that sovereign power is read into contracts in order to maintain legal order.236  
Under such circumstances, a choice of time of law clause might be perceived as an 
attempt to curtail governmental sovereignty, curtailing the effect of the government’s 
ability to rule and the courts’ ability to make decisions.  However, a different perspective 
is that courts still retain their sovereignty simply because they have the freedom and 
authority to decide whether a choice of time of law clause is valid.237  Courts have the 
authority to decide amongst competing public policies when they adjudicate contract 
clauses.  For instance, under the federal system, the Supreme Court has the authority to 
decide between the autonomy to contract versus a state’s police power.  Likewise, a 
legislature is free to exercise its authority and sovereignty by banning choice of time of 
law clauses by statute.  The very existence of such authority to decide the fate of such 
clauses, in itself, constitutes sovereignty.  Therefore, choice of time of law clauses should 
not be considered obstacles to sovereignty.238  
 
LEGAL INSTITUTE, http://www.ali.org/doc/past_present_ALIprojects.pdf (last updated April 2010).  For 
Article 2 as enacted by a particular state and any proposed revisions, see Cornell University Law School, 
Uniform Commercial Code Locator– Article 2 Sales, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE (Mar. 15, 2004), 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/ucc.html#a2. 
232 See, e.g., Castleman v. Scudder, 185 P.2d 35, 37 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (“Into all contracts is 
superimposed the higher authority of the state . . . .”). 
233 This is a primary concern with stabilization clauses in international contracts.  See, e.g., SHEMBERG, 
supra note 31, at viii.  See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 130, at Vol. II, 10 (describing judicially 
developed policies, the policy against interfering with the judicial process). 
234 Government, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/government (last visited Apr. 
18, 2010) (“[T]he political direction and control exercised over the actions of the members, citizens, or 
inhabitants of communities, societies, and states; direction of the affairs of a state, community, etc.; 
political administration: Government is necessary to the existence of civilized society.”).   
235 See, e.g., Consumer Protection, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, http://www.oag.state.tx.us/consumer 
(last updated Nov. 8, 2010). 
236 City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508 (1965) (“[N]ot only is the constitutional provision 
qualified by the measure of control which the State retains over remedial processes, but the State also 
continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people.  It does not matter that 
legislation appropriate to that end ‘has the result of modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect.’ 
Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the 
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal 
order. This principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the necessary residuum of state 
power has had progressive recognition in the decisions of this Court.’”) (citation omitted).  
237 International arbitral tribunals have generally upheld the stabilization provisions in international 
contracts by reason that entry into a contract is itself an exercise of sovereignty.  Emeka, supra note 152, at 
1324. 
238 Note, the sovereignty concern comes up in international contracts partly because the two negotiating 
parties are unequal, or at least different, because one is a government that has sole authority to change the 
laws.  This is not true domestically as contemplated in this paper.  The majority of contracts involve two 
private parties; both are subjected to the very same new or old law governing the contracts and their 
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¶58 Yet another policy concern is that choice of time of law clauses that attempt to keep 
the status quo may be perceived as circumventing the progress of law.239  However, 
certain limitations on contracts, such as the duration of a contract, temper any such 
concerns about retarding the progression of law.  First, short-lived contracts expire before 
too many laws have changed.  Even if laws do change, the parties are released from their 
choice of time of law obligations relatively soon after the changes.  Patents have a life 
span of only twenty years240 and technology changes rapidly.241  As a result, patent 
licenses are of relatively short duration.  Similarly, transactions in food or goods usually 
comprise only short-term contracts because market conditions change constantly.242  
Second, for longer-term contracts, one solution is that any contract with freezing clauses 
can be limited in duration by parties to five years or limited only to select areas of legal 
changes.  Thus, long-term contracts can have limits placed upon them.  Lastly, courts 
reserve the power to verify whether a choice of time of law clause substantively impedes 
public policy on a case-by-case basis before deciding to enforce a clause.  
¶59 Finally, a policy concern of the courts is the efficiency of adjudication.243  If a 
contract has choice of time of law clause, especially a freezing provision, it may force 
courts to adjudicate under prior law and to keep track of multiple sets of laws.  However, 
courts already undertake this task under the existing, traditional choice of law clauses in 
contracts.  For example, courts apply the laws of other states,244 or the CAFC applies 
regional law rather than its own set of laws in many contract cases and on civil procedure 
matters.245  Courts also retroactively apply new laws to some past events and may analyze 
 
content.  Or in the case of the governmental contracts between a state and a private party, a choice of time 
of law clause might have been very appropriate to avoid litigation like in United States Trust.  The various 
domestic governmental entities retain the authority and the option to exercise the ultimate sovereignty over 
both parties and their contract. 
239 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 76 (1974) (“[C]onstitutional concepts of equal protection are 
not ‘immutably frozen like insects trapped in Devonian amber.’”) (citation omitted). 
240 Wyeth v. Kappos, 591 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In 1994, the law changed the effective 
term of a patent from seventeen years commencing from issuance to twenty years from filing.”). 
241 One circuit judge began his opinion with a lament “[t]his case illustrates how fast technology can 
outdistance the capacity of contract drafters to provide for the ramifications of a computer software 
licensing arrangement.”  Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 
1999) (attempting to determine copyright infringement on software that saw significant changes and 
improvements within a mere few months after a license agreement was made).  See also NIMMER, supra 
note 62, at 224–43 (Ch. 5 § III. Changing Technology and Content). 
242 Indeed, quantifying what represents the “food industry” is itself a near impossible task.  See Sarah 
Murray, The World’s Biggest Industry, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2007, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2007/11/11/growth-agriculture-business-forbeslife-food07-
cx_sm_1113bigfood.html. 
243 E.g. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 130, at Vol. II, 9–11 (describing judicially 
developed policies, the policy against encouraging litigation). 
244 See generally, Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 (1951) (holding that a Wisconsin statutory policy 
excluding Illinois wrongful death claims violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Peresipka v. Elgin, 
Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 231 F.2d 268, 275 (7th Cir. 1956) (“[A]side from the principles of conflict of laws, we 
are of the view under the reasoning of Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 71 S.Ct. 980, 982, 95 L.Ed. 1212, 
that an Indiana court was required under the Full Faith and Credit clause of the Constitution of the United 
States to give effect to the law of Illinois . . . .”). 
245 See, e.g., Imation Corp. v. Koninklijke Philip Elecs. N.V., 586 F.3d 980, 985 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(applying New York contract law to a patent license); Rentrop v. Spectranetics Corp., 550 F.3d 1112, 1118 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The Federal Circuit ‘defers to the law of the regional circuits on matters of procedural 
law that do not implicate issues of patent law.’”).  
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two sets of laws.246  Lastly, courts, including the Supreme Court, have applied the laws 
existing at the time of contract.247  Thus, contracts containing freezing clauses should not 
pose a major hurdle during adjudication.  If anything, the old laws may be better 
developed and have a larger body of precedents that could facilitate adjudication as 
opposed to new laws that still need to be interpreted. 
B. Case Specific Policy Concerns 
¶60 The second category of public policy concerns that may prevent the enforceability 
of a choice of time of law clause is case specific.  Courts balance policy concerns against 
contractual obligations by considering several factors, including 1) the reasonableness 
and necessity of the new law,248 2) any changed circumstances and their impact, 3) 
whether there were alternative solutions instead of enacting new legislation, 4) whether a 
lesser modification of the laws would have achieved the same goals, and 5) whether the 
new law would have negative consequences.249  Yet other factors could include 
countervailing public policies such as enforcing the “justified expectations” of a 
contract,250 and the lack of foreseeability and notice that may hinder the parties’ freedom 
and rights to have a contract with a choice of law clause.251 
¶61 For example, new food safety laws are arguably very compelling and would 
probably pass scrutiny under the different factors listed above.  A contract that freezes the 
interpretation and execution under old food safety laws would probably not be 
enforceable.  Understandably, new food safety regulations are in the public’s immediate 
best interest, because no one wants to be harmed by unsafe foods.  As such, food 
companies ought to be interested in adopting the latest regulations252 and might draft a 
freezing clause only for other, non-food areas of law.253  For instance, if there are new 
regulations for food packaging rather than food safety, the very same company might 
welcome a freezing clause for packaging regulations in order to avoid the extra costs of 
retooling for new packages.254  
 
246 See, e.g., Lufkin v. McCallum, 956 F.2d 1104, 1107 (11th Cir. 1992) (considering whether litigants 
actually relied on the old rule and how they would suffer from the retroactive application of the new); VE 
Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (regarding the effect of 
changes in the venue statutes on two consolidated cases, one which began before the change in statute and 
one which began after). 
247 United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 (1977). 
248 Id. at 22–23; East New York Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 233 (1945).  
249 United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 28–32.  
250 Fresh Cut, Inc. v. Fazli, 650 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (Ind. 1995) (“[T]he factors . . . to be considered in 
determining whether a contract not prohibited by statute or clearly tending to injure public but nevertheless 
alleged to contravene public policy should be enforced, (i) the nature of the subject matter of contract; (ii) 
the strength of the public policy underlying statute; (iii) the likelihood that refusal to enforce the bargain or 
term will further that policy; (iv) how serious or deserved would be forfeiture suffered by party attempting 
to enforce bargain; and (v) the parties' relative bargaining power and freedom to contract.”). 
See also the many factors listed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178, 179 (2010).   
251 Under the closely related topic of forum shopping, these are factors that are considered by courts.  
See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991). 
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¶62 However, regardless of the factors courts will consider in shaping policy, the 
threshold needed to invalidate a choice of law provision is high,255 and this heightened 
threshold is expected to carry over to a choice of time of law clause because the rationale 
for both provisions is the same.256 
C. Public Policy that Approves a Choice of Time of Law Clause 
¶63 In contrast to the foregoing, there is a public policy argument in favor of choice of 
law and choice of time of law provisions.  The public policy justifying a choice of law 
clause emanates from the Contract Clause,257 the Restatements for contracts and for 
conflict of laws, the U.C.C., and even procedural rules such as Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 1—the policy of providing certainty and peace of mind and efficiency afforded 
by contract.258  The same policy should also extend to justifying a choice of time of law 
clause as well.  Thus, the question really becomes which public policy prevails in any 
given case, the policies behind the choice of time of law or some other policy. 
¶64 Unlike with food safety, implementing new patent and patent license laws is 
arguably not as urgent; therefore, the contract parties should be permitted to adopt and 
enforce a choice of time of law provision.259  For instance, the Supreme Court’s KSR 
decision championed the use of “common sense” in determining whether a purported 
invention is “obvious.”260  Subsequently, if a license dispute occurs over the obviousness 
(validity) of existing patents issued before the KSR decision, it may not be clear which 
way a judicial scale will tip, in favor of patent policy or in favor of a choice of time of 
law provision.261  The new KSR decision may not pass scrutiny under the factors used to 
balance policy against contract intent, such as the necessity of the new law or alternative 
solutions.  Perhaps, the new KSR decision may not be sufficiently compelling to 
overcome the policies of the freedom and expectations of contracts.262  In all likelihood, 
certain types of contracts will never permit containing a choice of time of law provision, 
such as for food, health care, and transportation safety regulations.  On the other hand, 
patent licensing could permit a choice of time of law, including freezing clauses, because 
patents are rarely so essential and life-sustaining, like food or health.263  
 
255 See the beginning of this Section.  See also BRUNSVOLD, supra note 182, at 268. 
256 See Section II.C and the beginning of Section IV. 
257 Curtis, supra note 159, at 336 n.98 (arguing why the Contract Clause supports U.S. government 
upholding stabilization) (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts’); Trustees. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); United States 
Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977)). 
258 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (The Rules “should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”).  See also supra Sections III.B and V. 
259 See Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 233–34 (1892) (regarding policies related to a patent 
contract).  
260 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007). 
261 See Papastavros, supra note 65, at 8. 
262 It is debatable whether the new “test” under KSR is better or worse than the old test.  The policy 
behind KSR is to deny patents to trivial inventions and to move away from the previous, more rigid TSM 
test.  On the other hand, a “common sense” test is nebulous and subjective because different people have a 
different sense of what is “common” when it comes to inventions.  By contrast, the TSM test was rigorous 
and objective, which has merits as well.  See generally Lester Horwitz, Horwitz on Some Strategies on the 
Question of Obviousness, 2008 Emerging Issues 792 (2007) (LexisNexis). 
263 Patents are not necessarily essential.  Patents and patent licenses are largely vehicles for economic 
transactions.  When one party benefits, the other party loses, and vice versa.  There is little moral right or 
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D. A Test to Determine Whether a Choice of Time of Law Clause is Valid 
¶65 If there are public policy concerns in a particular case surrounding a choice of time 
of law provision, this paper proposes a test to help courts determine whether a choice of 
time of law clause should be valid and enforceable.  The proposed test (“Test”) consists 
of verifying whether the clause could have been drafted in alternative language at the 
time of contract execution and whether the contract would still be valid under the new 
law and not in violation of public policy.  That is, the Test would ask if there is a legally 
valid alternative.  A party trying to enforce the clause would have the burden of 
proposing the substitute language in the event of litigation.  Then, the court shall decide 
whether the substitute language is valid as a matter of law.  
¶66 For instance, suppose A and B entered into a football gambling contract a year ago 
with a provision selecting “Texas law existing on the date of contract execution.”264  
Further suppose, Texas abolishes gambling as being against public policy; then, the 
question is whether the choice of time of law clause is still valid.  Applying the Test, a 
court would decide whether the clause could have been alternatively drafted at the time 
when the contract was executed.  The party arguing for the validity of the choice of time 
of law clause should attempt to find alternative language that would not violate public 
policy.  For example, suppose the party substitutes the phrase “Nevada law” for “Texas 
law.”  Also suppose that the parties could indeed have selected Nevada law and gambling 
was and still is permitted in Nevada.  Under these circumstances, a court should find the 
choice of time clause to be valid and enforceable.  The rationale is that there is an 
alternative that was or is legally acceptable under the original language of “Texas law 
existing at the time of contract execution.”  The existence of a legitimate alternative 
means that the original contract language would still be acceptable under some aspect of 
Texas public policy. 
¶67 As another example, which parallels an actual case,265 suppose publishing house P 
entered into a contract with author A to pay for his copyrighted material, relying on a 
phrase “copyright law existing on the date of contract execution” clause.  Then, suppose 
the United States extended the copyright term for the public policy reason of harmonizing 
with that of other countries’ copyright laws.  Suppose A wants to be paid for the 
additional years under the new law in effect.  But, consider if P can show there was no 
intent or perhaps no purpose in paying for any extra years (e.g. because the book would 
no longer be topical).  P could have originally drafted alternate language such as “pay for 
A’s material for ten years,” which did and does not violate public policy and is obviously 
 
wrong, let alone health or safety issues.  Although some argue that patents encourage inventions and the 
spread of knowledge, other areas advance rapidly and openly without the need for patents.  Math and 
science principles by themselves are not patentable and yet they flourish.  Scientists publish openly and 
share their discoveries and science has advanced in leaps and bounds.  See generally Gottschalk v. Benson, 
409 U.S. 63, 71–2 (1972) (holding one may not patent an idea that has no substantial practical application); 
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (“A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an 
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive 
right.”). 
As further evidence that patents are not essentials, there is open (i.e. unpatented and free) software.  
Wikipedia has also thrived in advancing knowledge, freely.  See WIKIPEDIA, http://www.wikipedia.org/ 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2011). 
264 This question was provided by Professor Adam Todd, Southern Methodist University, Spring 2010. 
265 BJM, Inc. v. Melport Corp., 18 F. Supp. 2d 704 (W.D. Ky. 1998). 
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a legitimate, legally acceptable condition.  Accordingly, a court should find the choice of 
time of law provision valid and enforceable.  
¶68 On the other hand, the food safety laws offer a contrary example.  Suppose parties 
S (seller) and B (buyer) contracted for hotdogs with a provision “food laws existing on 
the date of contract execution.”  Suppose a dye in the hotdogs causes cancer and a new 
food law permits only a different dye in hotdogs.  If S does not want to pay extra for the 
more expensive dye then S can either use no dye (but then, the hotdog looks unpalatable 
and unmarketable) or use the more expensive dye.  S should not be allowed to rely on the 
original contract clause to revert to the old food regulation because his dye causes cancer, 
which clearly violates public interest.  Had the harm been discovered earlier, 
theoretically, the regulation would have already been in existence at the time of contract 
execution.  Under these circumstances, the court should hold the choice of time of law 
clause invalid because it violates an essential public interest, and S must follow the new 
law.  In this scenario, S should have negotiated a contract with a hybrid clause instead of 
a freezing clause in order to mitigate his risk allocation.  S could have contracted to share 
any increased costs due to new regulations.  Regardless, by utilizing the Test, courts have 
discretion to decide whether a choice of time of law provision should be enforceable. 
¶69 As a final note, there are other justifications for the Test.  For instance, it is 
consistent with Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(1) and general contract 
interpretation.  In fact, the plain meaning of  § 187(1) suggests the Test.266  “The [time of] 
law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be 
applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit 
provision in their agreement directed to that issue.”267  The words “time of” have been 
inserted by the author to argue for a choice of time of law.  Notice how easily a new 
provision could be added to the Restatement to implement this paper’s proposed solution. 
VI. WHAT IS SPECIAL (AKA “DIFFICULT”) ABOUT PATENT LICENSING? 
¶70 Patent licenses are one type of contract.  Not taking into account legal costs, in 
1994, U.S. patent licensing generated at least $33 billion in revenue per year; in 2002, the 
figure grew to about $68 billion268 and over $100 billion in 2005.269  Revenue is expected 
to continue to increase because the number of patents granted per year more than doubled 
since 2002.270  Commentators indicate that patent licenses particularly need to include a 
choice of law clause.271  Considering all the legal changes in patent law over the last three 
or four years, this paper contends that the licenses also need a choice of time of law 
 
266 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 180, at 225 (summarizing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187, cmt. c). 
267 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) (1971) (emphasis added).   
268 RUSSELL PARR, ROYALTY RATES FOR LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 18 (2007) (The 
companies with the largest U.S. patent portfolios are IBM, GE, Canon, Hitachi, Toshiba, NEC, Kodak, 
Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Sony, Motorola, Siemens, Philips, AT&T, and the U.S. Navy.). 
269 See Licensing Royalty Revenues, INVENTION STATISTICS, 
http://www.inventionstatistics.com/Licensing_Royalty_Revenues.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). 
270 See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov (last visited Apr. 18, 
2011); Number of New Patents Issued, INVENTION STATISTICS, 
http://www.inventionstatistics.com/Number_of_New_Patents_Issued.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). 
271 See generally NIMMER & DODD, supra note 139, § 2:57 (“In part because of the confusing and 
uncertain background law, most licenses specify what law governs disputes relating to a license”). 
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provision.272  Moreover, there are many different areas of laws that could conceivably 
change and impinge on patent licenses over the lifetime of a license.  
¶71 Patents themselves are governed by federal statutes and common law created 
mostly by the U.S. Supreme Court and the CAFC.273  However, the licenses themselves 
are contracts, and state contract law should apply to the contract aspects of the licenses.274  
But, occasionally, the courts will apply federal patent license law created by federal 
courts.275  Also, patent license litigation is sometimes conducted in state courts,276 but 
more often it is conducted in federal courts, because patents are a constitutional matter.277  
But, if a case is appealed to the CAFC, the court may apply its own laws or may apply 
other federal circuit law (e.g. Fifth Circuit, Ninth Circuit, etc.).278  Also, given the amount 
of forum shopping in patent litigation,279 the effect of different local rules and particular 
judge-made rules becomes more of an issue.  Finally, federal patent statutes, common 
law, and a very large body of U.S. Patent Office administrative280 law could also apply to 
the patent licenses.  Given this myriad of laws, patent licensing parties may do well to 
track down as much certainty as possible by including a choice of time of law provision.  
Otherwise, because there are so many different governing laws, some regulation is bound 
to change and disturb the parties’ intended agreement.  For example, the agreement might 
include the following provision in bold face type281 and perhaps exclude the local conflict 
of law rules because of the divergence among the different local rules.282  
Governing Law. 
This Agreement shall be deemed to have been entered into and shall be 
interpreted and governed in all respects by the judicial and legislative laws of the 
State of Texas and the United States of America, existing at the time of execution 
of this Agreement, without giving effect to their conflict of laws rules. 
 
272 KSR, Bilski, Quanta Computer, and Transcore are only a sample of the major patent or patent 
licensing cases decided by the Supreme Court or the CAFC in the last three years.  
273 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . 
.”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under 
this Constitution . . . .”). 
274 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (“Commercial agreements traditionally 
are the domain of state law.  State law is not displaced merely because the contract relates to intellectual 
property . . . .”).  See also U.C.C. § 1-103, comment 3 (2009). 
275 35 U.S.C. § 261 (Ownership; assignment).  See also Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 
U.S. 617 (2008) (holding that due to patent exhaustion, the initial authorized sale of a patented item 
terminates all patent rights to that item). 
276 See, e.g., City of Hope Nat’l Med. Ctr. v. Genentech, Inc., 181 P.3d 142 (Cal. 2008). 
277 U.S. CONST., art. I, cl. 8. 
278 See Ted L. Field, Improving the Federal Circuit's Approach to Choice of Law for Procedural Matters 
in Patent Cases, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 643 (2009). 
279 There is so much forum shopping that the Eastern District of Texas, where no high tech companies 
are incorporated, has about the same number of patent cases as California’s Silicon Valley.  Some federal 
courts have a reputation for being a patent rocket docket.  See JUSTIA: DOCKETS & FILINGS, 
http://dockets.justia.com/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (providing statistics on court filings). 
280 For example, Title 37, Code of Federal Regulation, and any other U.S. Patent Office rules. 
281 Dunn, supra note 192, at 41 (The choice of law clause for certain kinds of contracts must be made 
conspicuous or it may not be enforceable.). 
282 With the exception of the choice of time, the example is borrowed from a medical consortium 
membership agreement.  See MEDBIQUITOUS, http://www.medbiq.org/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2011). 
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¶72 Our laws are not frozen into immutable form like insects trapped in Devonian 
amber, but instead are constantly undergoing revision.  There are bound to be changes in 
laws that are not welcomed by contracting parties.  Such a scenario is particularly ironic 
for parties to a contract because the changes may defeat the very purpose of preserving a 
binding agreement in writing.  In the U.S., there should be a proactive solution of 
supplementing the traditional choice of territorial law through a choice of time of law 
clause to safeguard against detrimental new legislation, regulations, and common law.283  
Importantly, a choice of time of law provision can be consistent with constitutional law, 
state contract law, and the rules on conflict of laws.  Should public policy concerns arise 
against such a provision, this paper proposed the Test to help courts weigh which policy 
should prevail—the policy of upholding the intent of the parties by a contract or some 
other policy interests. 
¶73 As for practical matters, a choice of time of law clause is a useful tool that domestic 
contracting parties may implement to ease their minds, gain more certainty, draft 
workarounds to disadvantageous law, and reduce litigation.  Such a tool is particularly 
useful in constantly evolving areas such as patent law.  Initially, it might be difficult to 
introduce the concept to the U.S. courts, but the tool has been used in international 
contracts and adjudicated in international courts, both of which can serve as practicable 
examples.  Additionally, there have even been a few U.S. cases where a contract party 
selected future legislative law and the courts did not disapprove of the practice.  As such, 
it is certainly plausible to continue and then popularize the practice.  When courts try to 
decide whether to enforce a choice of time of law clause, they may apply the Test, which 
requires the proponent of the clause to provide substitute language for the matter at issue, 
which the party could have drafted into the original contract but did not do so because the 
party relied on its selection clause instead.  If the substitute language creates a contract 
that does not violate public policy, then the choice of time of law clause should be 
deemed acceptable in that instance.  In summary, domestic parties should be free to 
include and try to enforce a choice of time of law clause in their contracts because there 
are few theoretical and practical obstacles to implementing such a useful tool. 
283 One commentator believes that the ex post facto clause in the Constitution applies also to the 
common law.  Robert H. Hughes, That Was Then, But That's What Counts: Freezing the Law of R.S. 2477, 
2002 UTAH L. REV. 679, 696–97 (2002) (citing Shell Oil Co. v. M/T GILDA, 790 F.2d 1209, 1213 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (“In general, parties intending to be bound by a statute intend to be bound by the body of judicial 
decisions interpreting and applying the statute.”); Saint Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Rutland, 225 F.2d 689, 
692 (5th Cir. 1955)).  However, the role of “interpreting” the legislative law often leads to new common 
law.  This is also true where there is only common law in existence and no legislation.  Also, there are 
many cases where the opinion states that judicial decisions may take retroactive effect. 
